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Sommario
L’approccio Software Deﬁned Networking (SDN) e` una novita` nel campo
delle reti informatiche. La migliore ﬂessibilita`, la gestione sempliﬁcata e la
riduzione dei costi promesse dal paradigma SDN fanno pensare a molti che
questo sia il futuro delle reti. L’intuizione principale di SDN sta nella sep-
arazione tra la conﬁgurazione, il controllo della rete e l’instradamento dei
pacchetti a basso livello. In questo modo, lo sviluppo del complesso software
di controllo diventa indipendente dai cambiamenti di instradamento e switch-
ing a livello hardware. Facendo aﬃdamento su un’interfaccia ben deﬁnita, un
programma di controllo pu supervisionare l’intera rete composta da parecchi
switch, di diversi produttori. Nella mia tesi argomento, invece, che questa
visione idealizzata diﬃcile da ottenere in pratica e che un controllore SDN
non puo` trattare tutti gli switch in modo eguale. Ci sono parecchie ragioni
per le quali switch che implementano la stessa speciﬁca rimanono eterogenei:
speciﬁche non chiare, diﬃcili implementazioni, costi ed errori umani.
In questa tesi descrivo un approccio a due fasi per gestire l’eterogeneit
degli switch SDN. In primo luogo presento delle tecniche sistematiche per
rilevare diﬀerenze tra componenti diversi. SOFT e` un metodo, che ho deﬁnito
ed implementato, che mette allo scoperto diﬀerenze funzionali tra diversi
software di switching. Si basa su ben note tecniche di analisi software ed
un nuovo modo di applicare un risolutore di constraint per trovare input
che causano un diverso comportamento degli switch. Inoltre, deﬁnisco una
metodologia sistematica per eﬀettuare misure di prestazioni sulle richieste
di aggiornamento degli switch. Sviluppo anche un tool di misura basato
su questa tecnica che e` in grado di computare le caratteristiche del tasso
di aggiornamento degli switch hardware. Questa metodologia, in aggiunta,
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tracciando le interazioni tra lo strato di controllo e di gestione dati durante gli
aggiornamenti, e` in grado di rivelare le inconsistenze che mostrano quando
gli switch non seguono la speciﬁca. Inﬁne risolvo il piu` grosso problema
rilevato. RUM, uno strato software che si pone tra il controllore e gli switch,
maschera e aggiusta le notiﬁche di aggiornamento scorrette che arrivano da
switch problematici.
Dimostro l’utilit della soluzione descritta analizzando degli switch es-
istenti. SOFT individua diverse inconsistenze tra due switch open source. Il
benchmark di prestazioni rivela degli errori che compromettono la sicurezza di
rete. Fornisce anche delle caratteristiche dettagliate sugli switch che dovreb-
bero essere prese in considerazione dagli sviluppatori di applicazioni lato con-
trollore per migliore le prestazioni di rete. RUM previene perdite di pacchetti
con un aggiornamento dell’instradamento sicuro senza che alcuna modiﬁca
sia necessaria agli switch problematici.
Parole Chiave:
Software Deﬁned Network, switch, aﬃdabilita`, interoperabilita`,
prestazioni, ﬂow table, aggiornamenti, OpenFlow
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Abstract
Software Deﬁned Networking (SDN) is a novel approach to building computer
networks. Improved ﬂexibility, simpliﬁed management and cost reduction
promised by SDN makes many see it as the future of networking. The main
insight of SDN is the separation of network control and conﬁguration deci-
sions from packet forwarding devices. This way, complex control software
development becomes independent of changes in hardware traﬃc forward-
ing switches. Relying on a well-deﬁned interface, a controller program can
supervise the whole network built of many switches, produced by multiple
vendors. I argue however, that this idealized vision is diﬃcult to achieve in
practice and that an SDN controller cannot treat all switches equally. There
are multiple reasons why switches following the same speciﬁcation are hetero-
geneous: unclear speciﬁcation, implementation diﬃculties, cost, and human
errors.
In this dissertation, I describe a two-phase approach to handle switch
diversity in SDN. First, I present systematic techniques to detect various
diﬀerences between devices. SOFT is a method and a tool that uncovers
functional diﬀerences in switch software. It relies on established software
analysis techniques and a novel application of a constraint solver to ﬁnd in-
puts that result in distinct behavior of two switches. Further, I design a
systematic methodology for switch update performance measurements. A
benchmarking tool based on this technique computes update rate character-
istics of hardware switches. By additionally tracking interactions between
control and data planes during the update, this methodology is capable of
revealing inconsistencies showing that the switches do not follow the speciﬁ-
cation. Finally, I address the most severe issue detected. RUM, a software
v
layer between the controller and the switches masks and ﬁxes incorrect rule
update notiﬁcations coming from faulty switches.
I demonstrate the usefulness of the described solutions by analyzing ex-
isting switches. SOFT detected several inconsistencies between two open
source software switches. The performance benchmark revealed errors that
compromise network security. It also provided detailed switch characteris-
tics that should be taken into account by controller developers to improve
network performance. RUM prevents packet drops in a safe network update
without requiring any changes to faulty switches.
Keywords:
Software Deﬁned Networks, switches, reliability, interoperability,
performance, ﬂow table updates, OpenFlow
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Computer Networks
Computer networks are essential components of modern life. Whether to
work, get entertained, look for information, do shopping, or contact others,
people use the Internet and cloud services every day. As part of the critical
infrastructure, computer networks need to be reliable and keep working all
the time, even when facing network element failures. Moreover, the ever
growing need for connectivity poses strong extensibility and maintainability
requirements for the networks.
Years of research have led to a slowly evolving network architecture char-
acterized by a set of best practices. To avoid single points of failure, networks
are composed of multiple independent devices (e.g., switches, routers, mid-
dleboxes) that communicate using well-deﬁned protocols. This way, after an
addition or a failure of one entity, the remaining nodes can follow standard-
ized procedures to reconverge their packet forwarding states. Further, by
relying on common protocols, the devices produced by diﬀerent vendors and
managed by diﬀerent operators can work together in one global network.
However, traditional computer networks are diﬃcult to manage and leave
little room for innovation. Introducing new functionalities or modifying the
existing ones requires support at many levels. First, the standardizing body
needs to deﬁne a new protocol. This process often takes years and is followed
by detailed interoperability testing, as the new protocol cannot be in conﬂict
with existing ones. Since switches and routers run proprietary software to
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implement the standardized protocols, any implementation change requires
vendors’ intervention. If the feature is in low demand, switch and router
developers may take a long time to provide it. Further, administrators con-
ﬁgure each device individually at the protocol level, using its conﬁguration
interface. The conﬁguration interfaces and commands diﬀer across vendors,
which leads to vendor-speciﬁc courses and certiﬁcates for network operators.
As a result, network administrators have to be familiar with many protocols
and many conﬁguration interfaces. Adapting new protocols and devices in
a network induces an additional cost of staﬀ training. A recent legal con-
ﬂict between Cisco and Arista about using similar command line interfaces
shows that networking gear vendors are not interested in changing this situa-
tion [18]. All the above results in vendor lock-ins, where the network owners
are forced to heavily depend on a single switch/router provider. Finally, since
the network is conﬁgured at a protocol level with many protocols running
concurrently, it is diﬃcult to reason about a global network state.
While a majority of computer networks is still following the traditional
approach, research eﬀorts to simplify network management are quickly get-
ting traction.
1.2 Software Deﬁned Networks
Software Deﬁned Networking (SDN) is a recent approach to build computer
networks that promises to simplify network management and lower the bar-
rier for deploying new functionalities. It is gradually replacing the traditional
design in data center [78], campus [54], and wide area networks [39, 43,45].
The core concept in the SDN paradigm is physical separation of the data
and control planes in the network [64]. The control plane decides how to
conﬁgure the network and the data plane forwards packets according to this
2
conﬁguration. Unlike in the traditional case, where both planes were located
inside the same device (e.g., switch, router), in SDN the control plane of
multiple switches is realized in a single software program running on external
computers. One control program supervises multiple data plane devices via
a general conﬁguration protocol.
This novel design solves many problems present in the traditional ap-
proach to networking. First, introducing a new functionality requires a net-
work operator to prepare a software program instead of making individual
changes to hardware devices. Moreover, the control program is written in
a high level programming language. Since the switches are conﬁgured ex-
ternally, they become simpler and cheaper. Complexity gets moved to a
software program running on a server machine. Further, as vendors are no
longer involved in the process, network innovation accelerates and becomes
more dynamic. Network operators get ﬂexibility — they choose what func-
tions they need and want to provide and can do it quickly.
1.2.1 OpenFlow
OpenFlow [64] is the most popular open protocol used to realize SDN con-
cepts in practice. The protocol speciﬁcation deﬁnes an interface and mes-
sages exchanged between the control program (often called controller) and
data plane packet forwarding devices called OpenFlow switches. Figure 1.1
shows an overview of the OpenFlow-based design.
1.2.1.1 OpenFlow Controller
A controller serves a crucial role in a software deﬁned network. It collects
statistics and other information from the network and makes appropriate
reconﬁguration decisions. Additionally, since the controller runs on a reg-
3
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Figure 1.1: An overview of SDN realized with OpenFlow. The
controller conﬁgures the OpenFlow switch using OpenFlow mes-
sages sent over a secure channel. OpenFlow agent running at the
switch parses the messages and updates rules in the ﬂow table
accordingly.
ular computer, it can also pull data from other sources than the switches.
Consider, for example, a control program that adjusts routing based on a
machine reservation system in a cloud or expected popular social events in a
mobile network.
An OpenFlow controller is usually constructed as a layered, modular sys-
tem. On top of a controller platform, developers create so called controller
applications that realize particular functionalities such as topology discov-
ery, routing, load balancing. While controller platforms are often compared
to operating systems [38, 75], basic platforms such as NOX [6] provide only
message handling and translation between data structures and the wire for-
mat. More advanced, distributed platforms such as Onix [56] and ONOS [19]
spread state across multiple machine to improve fault tolerance. Contrary to
a common misconception, an SDN controller does not have to be centralized.
Commercial solutions rely on distribution and replication to improve perfor-
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mance and reliability. The controller platforms often come with a set of basic
and frequently used applications such as shortest path routing and link state
detection. This way other, problem-speciﬁc applications reuse the common
code. In the end, a fully functional controller contains a mesh of interdepen-
dent applications. Since the distinction between the controller platform and
the applications is often blurry, in this dissertation the term controller refers
to the entire modular control program.
Controller platforms try to balance programming simplicity and perfor-
mance by choosing diﬀerent programming languages such as C++ (NOX [6]),
Java (Floodlight [4], Beacon [32]), Python (POX [12], Ryu [14]). Finally, as
is the case for any modern programming technique, various supporting tools
and abstractions make programming networks simpler. The control software
developer can use one of the high level network programming abstractions
to reason about the network at a high level in an intuitive manner [35, 47].
1.2.1.2 OpenFlow Switches
An OpenFlow switch is a generic packet forwarding device that replaces
switches, routers, and middleboxes known from traditional networks. There
are two main logical components of an OpenFlow switch: a ﬂow table and
an OpenFlow agent.
OpenFlow agent. An OpenFlow agent is a software component running
at a switch. Its role is to expose a standardized programmatic interface to
the switch forwarding tables and to handle the communication with the con-
troller. The agent also performs initial message validation and error checking.
Flow table. The controller directly conﬁgures the switches by inserting
low-level forwarding rules in their ﬂow tables. The ﬂow table is a set of
match-action rules that deﬁne how the switch should handle packets. Each
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forwarding rule consists of a general match pattern that matches packet head-
ers and optionally a port at which the packet arrived. The matches span ﬁelds
belonging to multiple encapsulation layers and traditional networking proto-
cols (Ethernet, IP, TCP/UDP, and others). Moreover, each match can either
deﬁne the expected value of each ﬁeld, or mark a ﬁeld as unimportant by
wildcarding it. Actions include modifying headers, dropping and forwarding
packets to one or many ports, or encapsulating them in an OpenFlow mes-
sage and sending to the controller for further analysis. For each data plane
packet, the switch applies instructions or actions deﬁned by the highest pri-
ority rule matching this packet. Additionally, each rule has a set of counters
assigned. These counters collect statistics about the number of packets and
bytes forwarded by a given rule. Newer OpenFlow speciﬁcations introduce a
notion of multiple ﬂow tables that get chained and form a packet processing
pipeline.
In practice switches realize the abstract ﬂow table as two separate tables.
First, an OpenFlow agent parses an incoming rule modiﬁcation message,
checks for errors and places the desired rule in the software ﬂow table. Af-
terwards, the updates are propagated to the hardware ﬂow table managed
by an application-speciﬁc integrated circuit (ASIC). The main reason for
this split is limited bandwidth between the switch CPU and the ASIC. It
can become a bottleneck for frequent rule updates [29]. Independently, in
private communication switch vendors conﬁrmed that to reduce the impact
of hardware updates, they batch multiple rule modiﬁcations before sending
them to the ASIC. Moreover, to provide quick matching for general and
partially wildcarded matches required by SDN, rules in the hardware table
are stored in Ternary Content-Addressable Memory (TCAM). This type of
memory is expensive and has high power requirements [17], which limits its
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available capacity. Therefore, switches may choose not to move some rules
to hardware [21, 48]. On the other hand, only rules placed in the hardware
ﬂow table can guarantee high packet forwarding rates. Header matching and
packet forwarding in software is slower and overloads the switch CPU.
1.2.1.3 OpenFlow Commands
While this work considers all OpenFlow commands, these four are most rel-
evant to network reconﬁguration: rule modiﬁcations (Flow Mod), Barrier,
Packet Out, and Packet In.
Rule modiﬁcations (Flow Mod). The controller instructs the switch how
to conﬁgure its ﬂow table using ﬂow table modiﬁcation messages (Flow Mod,
sometimes called rule modiﬁcation message in this thesis). There are three
subtypes of the rule modiﬁcation message: addition of a new rule, deletion
of an existing rule, and change of an existing rule.
Barrier. Barrier is a multipurpose message used to order other messages
and to synchronize the switch and controller states. After receiving a Barrier
request, the switch has to ﬁnish processing all previously received messages
before executing any messages after the Barrier request. When the process-
ing is complete, the switch must send a Barrier reply message [11]. All older
speciﬁcations do not clarify what processing means exactly. Since OpenFlow
version 1.5, it is deﬁned that a switch can send the Barrier reply only when
all earlier messages are processed such that their eﬀects are visible in the
data plane.
Packet Out. The controller uses the Packet Out command to inject pack-
ets in the network data plane directly from a particular switch. The command
speciﬁes the packet header and its content, as well as on which of the switch
ports should the packet appear.
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Packet In. The Packet In command is the opposite of Packet Out. This
message encapsulates a data plane packet and sends it to the controller using
the control channel. There are two scenarios when such an event occurs: (i)
the packet matches a rule that speciﬁes a special “send to the controller”
action, or (ii) there is no matching rule and the switch sends packets to the
controller by default. The message contains the encapsulated packet itself
(or a part of its header) and the ingress port where the packet arrived.
1.2.2 Evolution of Network Devices
Years of steady development has lead to expensive and complex routers that
implement hundreds of protocols. In 2011, Cisco routers supported 700 dif-
ferent standards [15] while Juniper supported over 250 standards related to
routing alone [16]. Systems running on these machines contain over 20 mil-
lions lines of code and each device has to be separately updated.
The SDN revolution started in software switches ﬁrst. Open vSwitch [69]
providing OpenFlow 1.0 support enabled ﬁrst local OpenFlow tests. While
processing of packets in software is slower than in hardware, a modern evo-
lution of the Open vSwitch is capable of connecting virtual machines and
serves as the network edge in a virtualized environment [55]. This switch
implementation has been constantly maintained and developed to keep up
with the most recent protocol versions. It was also followed by other software
switches with OpenFlow support [3, 5].
When established networking gear vendors realized that SDN is getting
popular and there is demand for hardware OpenFlow switches, they started
adding extensions to their existing devices. The OpenFlow agent in these
switches is often based on Open vSwitch. Legacy devices with patched soft-
ware, such as HP ProCurve 5400zl, Dell PowerConnect 8132F and NEC
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IP8800 oﬀer limited support for OpenFlow. Existing forwarding, routing,
and ﬁltering tables have insuﬃcient ﬂexibility to perform general matches.
Their capacity is also insuﬃcient for SDN requirements. Moreover, not all
required actions can be applied in hardware, and complex rules get rejected
or get placed in the software ﬂow table. Since these devices were not de-
signed for frequent communication between CPU and ASICs, rule update
rate is low. Despite all the shortcomings, this ﬁrst generation of switches
allowed for initial prototype deployments and many of them still are the core
of many academic networks [7].
Finally, new companies such as Pica8 and NoviFlow took advantage of
the SDN popularity and entered the market with switches purposefully built
for programmable networks. The new generation of devices claims full Open-
Flow support in multiple versions and oﬀers improved performance. Their
hardware ﬂow tables ﬁt thousands of general rules with arbitrary matches
and actions.
The most recent trend in switch design argues for making switch hardware
interface fully open. Traditionally, switch hardware, an operating system and
speciﬁc feature implementations running at the switch were proprietary and
accessible only through a vendor-speciﬁc conﬁguration interface. While early
SDN eﬀorts standardized the interface and simpliﬁed the switch software, the
whitebox switches proposal goes a step further [76]. In a whitebox switch
only bare hardware is provided by vendors. Both the operating system and
applications are developed independently and users can get them from other
sources. This design is similar to a model successfully applied to personal
computers and servers for years.
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1.3 Motivation and Goals
The main assumption of Software Deﬁned Networking is that all data plane
elements are conﬁgured using a common, well-deﬁned programming interface
(API). Open APIs such as OpenFlow hide technological and implementation
details and give switch vendors freedom in choosing the best internal design.
However, because of the rapid development, devices that belong to dif-
ferent generations of SDN switch design exist in networks concurrently. This
diversity is further increased by several issues that make it diﬃcult to produce
error-free and functionally equal switch software and hardware.
First, the speciﬁcation is often ambiguous and can be interpreted in mul-
tiple, seemingly equally correct ways. Despite constant improvements and
clariﬁcations in new speciﬁcation revisions, there is no guarantee that two
independent teams implementing the same functionality will always under-
stand all the details in the same way.
Second, switch vendors sometimes have explicit implementation freedom
that can aﬀect network behavior.
Finally, especially the newest speciﬁcations deﬁne a large set of desired
functions some of which are diﬃcult or expensive to realize. Thus, vendors
may choose to simplify them or not to provide them at all, choosing higher
performance and lower cost over correctness.
Therefore, despite following the same speciﬁcation and exposing a the-
oretically uniﬁed interface, switches are likely to behave diﬀerently in some
corner case scenarios. If controller developers and network administrators are
unaware of these diﬀerences, the network behavior can become suboptimal,
unexpected or even incorrect. However, while switches are the main compo-
nent of Software Deﬁned Networks and their correct behavior is paramount
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for network reliability, there is little interest in switch testing [8, 72]. As for
any new technology, most of the SDN research is devoted toward developing
new functionalities. Testing eﬀorts that exist focus on the controllers and
network policies as a whole. They assume correctly working switches and
abstract them behind simpliﬁed models.
My goal in this dissertation is to start the process of bridging the gap
between the reality of heterogeneous switches and the theory of the uniﬁed
network view promised by the SDN vision. To this end, switches should be
interoperable from the point of view of the controller, which means that
switches supporting the same protocol version should be treated by the con-
troller equally, regardless of their implementation.
Two phases are essential for reaching this goal.
• Well-established methodologies to systematically measure, analyze and
understand switch heterogeneity are required to test existing and new
switches. Such testing tools will detect problems with new devices.
Depending on severity, the detected issues should be addressed by ven-
dors, acknowledged by controller developers and network operators, or
handled by runtime tools.
• A multilevel chain of runtime tools should mask the detected diﬀerences
without requiring changes to the switches or to the controller. Applying
modiﬁcations to hardware devices such as switches is troublesome and
slow because it requires vendor eﬀorts. On the other hand, it would be
wasteful and repetitive for all controllers to handle switch heterogeneity
on their own. Instead, I envision a chain of software-based proxies
layered between switches and controllers that mask both functional
and performance based diﬀerences to some extent.
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1.4 Solution Overview
I ﬁrst set to understand how big of an issue the switch heterogeneity is in
practice. There are two sources and types of diversity.
First, diﬀerences and errors in OpenFlow agent source code could lead to
inconsistent functional behavior of the switches. Since an agent is in essence
a regular program, I apply an established systematic software analysis tech-
nique — symbolic execution. Symbolically executing a program generates
its mathematical representation: each execution path is encoded as a set of
constraints which must hold for the execution of that path. Additionally, the
path execution produces a corresponding output. The constraints split the
space of switch inputs into subspaces. All elements in a given subspace re-
sult in the same output. In the second testing phase, I check if there are any
inconsistencies between the two switches by intersecting their input/output
spaces. Such a two phase approach solves the main challenge of this problem
— how to compare two switches without requiring simultaneous access to
their source codes.
The second type of inconsistency cannot be detected using static source
code analysis alone. It is related to interactions between the switch software
and hardware. Here, I designed a switch ﬂow table update measurement
methodology that systematically covers the input space (rule modiﬁcation
request sequences). The main feature of this methodology is that it as-
sumes not only precise observation of the control channel, but also requires
constant data plane monitoring. A switch benchmark that implements the
methodology also injects and captures packets matching newly installed rules.
This approach revealed various timing related issues with existing OpenFlow
switches.
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Finally, I propose a software-based solution to one of the detected prob-
lems. Switches diﬀer in terms of how precise they report rule modiﬁcations.
The biggest observed divergence from the truth is in order of minutes — a
delay that may even compromise network security. RUM is a software layer
between faulty switches and the controller that relies on additional tech-
niques to make sure that the switch really modiﬁes a rule. The techniques
vary from simply waiting for a safe time, through using artiﬁcial, probe rule
modiﬁcations, up to full probing of the network data plane. They diﬀer
in terms of the provided guarantees, assumptions about the switches, and
induced overhead.
1.5 Thesis Contributions
While working on achieving the thesis goals, I make the following contribu-
tions:
• I apply symbolic execution to systematically identify and compare code
paths in OpenFlow agents to determine input subspaces that result
in the same outputs. In the process, I identify what combinations
of symbolic and concrete inputs guarantee satisfactory running time
without sacriﬁcing coverage. I also show how observing external actions
of an agent leads to conclusions about its internal state.
• I demonstrate a novel use of a constraint solver to compute an intersec-
tion of input subspaces for diﬀerent agent implementations. It quickly
reveals inputs that cause diﬀerent behavior (inconsistencies) in multiple
agents. In addition, it works without any deﬁnition of correct behavior.
This phase is separate from symbolic execution and does not require
access to switch source code.
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• I devise a systematic methodology for switch control plane performance
testing along many diﬀerent dimensions. The methodology focuses
on measuring the interactions between the control plane and the data
plane. I also create and publicly release a benchmarking tool that
implements this methodology.
• I propose techniques that hide imprecise rule update notiﬁcations in
various SDN switches. The techniques oﬀer diﬀerent precision and
guarantees depending on the induced overhead and assumptions made
about the switch. All assumptions are based on the characteristics
observed in practical experiments. To validate my solutions, I create
RUM: a software layer that implements these techniques without re-
quiring any modiﬁcations to controllers and switches.
• I demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the technique that detects functional
diﬀerences between switches by applying it to the Reference Switch
(55K lines of code) and Open vSwitch (80K lines of code), the two pub-
licly available OpenFlow agent implementations. A tool implementing
the aforementioned technique found several inconsistencies between the
two switches.
• I show the usefulness of the performance measurement methodology
by presenting a detailed study of switch ﬂow table update rates. I also
report several types of anomalous behavior in OpenFlow switches that
were never revealed before.
• I show that RUM guarantees rule update conﬁrmations precise enough
to prevent any packet drops in a safe network update scenario, that
loses traﬃc for up to 290ms otherwise.
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1.6 Document Organization
In this chapter I presented a brief overview of Software Deﬁned Networking
and outlined my motivation for systematic analysis of the emerging SDN
switches.
In Chapter 2, I present a systematic approach to detecting functional
diﬀerences between OpenFlow switches. SOFT is a tool that relies on recent
advancements in software analysis techniques to detect inputs for which two
tested switches return diﬀerent outputs.
Chapter 3 presents an exhaustive study of ﬂow table update characteris-
tics in SDN switches. The systematic methodology introduced in this chapter
allows for measuring and analyzing both bare update performance, as well
as ﬁnding corner cases and surprising behaviors.
In Chapter 4, I present a software-based solution to the inconsistent
and incorrect Barrier implementations detected and described in Chapter 3.
RUM is a middle layer between the switches and a controller. It provides the
controller with reliable rule update conﬁrmations even when working with
unreliable switches.
Finally, I present the related work in Chapter 5 and conclude in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Detecting Functional Diﬀerences
This chapter focuses on the question how unclear speciﬁcation and imple-
mentation freedom aﬀect switches from the functional point of view. SOFT
(Systematic OpenFlow Testing) — a tool introduced here — automates in-
teroperability testing of OpenFlow switches by applying software analysis
techniques. To achieve exhaustive testing, we present an approach that lever-
ages the multiple, existing OpenFlow implementations to identify potential
interoperability problems by crosschecking their behaviors. Instead of deﬁn-
ing what the correct, expected behavior is, our method compares behavior
of the tested devices. Exploring code behaviors in a systematic way is key
to observing inconsistencies. Operating in two phases, SOFT uses symbolic
execution and constraint solving. In the ﬁrst testing phase, symbolic exe-
cution runs locally on each vendor’s source code. Then, using the outputs
of symbolic execution (not the source codes), SOFT determines the input
ranges (e.g., ﬁelds in OpenFlow messages) that cause two OpenFlow agent
implementations to exhibit diﬀerent behaviors.
2.1 Deﬁning Inconsistencies
Switches that are capable of supporting the OpenFlow Switch Speciﬁca-
tion [11] do so by running an OpenFlow agent. This agent is a piece of soft-
ware primarily responsible for state management. It receives and processes
control messages sent by OpenFlow controllers (e.g., Flow Mod, Packet Out,
etc.), and conﬁgures the switch forwarding tables accordingly to the given
commands. In addition, the OpenFlow agent may take part in packet for-
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warding itself — in a hardware switch, for packets that are forwarded to the
controller; in a pure software implementation, for every packet.
As such, the execution of the OpenFlow agent is mainly driven by external
events (e.g., rule installation requests). There are two channels that provide
data to the switch: control channel to the controller and data plane con-
nections. We make no distinction and use the term inputs to call the data
arriving at the agent as either OpenFlow control messages or data plane
packets.
Intuitively, an inconsistency occurs when two (or more) OpenFlow agents
that are presented with the same input sequence produce diﬀerent results.
Here, the results refer to both externally observable consequences when pro-
cessing an input (e.g., replying to a request for ﬂow table statistics), and
internal state changes (e.g., updating the ﬂow table with a new entry).
To be able to identify inconsistencies, we assume the agents support the
OpenFlow interface and we check for inconsistencies in operations at the in-
terface level. To crosscheck behaviors, we rely either on externally observable
results or, when necessary, on the probe packets to infer the internal state.
Note that, we are uninterested in verifying the underlying switching hard-
ware’s correctness. In fact, such veriﬁcation is typically already part of the
ASIC design process. However, we assume that there is a way to execute
the OpenFlow agent without the switching hardware, e.g., through an emu-
lation layer that is commonly readily available for development and testing
purposes.
2.2 Symbolic Execution Background
Our approach is inspired by the successful use of symbolic execution [53] in
automated testing of systems software [23–25,28,37]. The idea behind sym-
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bolic execution is to exercise all possible paths in a given program. Therefore,
unlike normal execution that runs the program with concrete values, symbolic
execution runs program code on symbolic input variables, which are initially
allowed to take any value. During symbolic execution, code is executed nor-
mally until it reaches a branch instruction where the conditional expression
expr depends (either directly or indirectly) on a symbolic value. At this
point, program execution is logically forked into two executions — one path
where the variables involved in expr must be constrained to make expr true;
another path where expr must be false. Internally, the symbolic execution
engine invokes a constraint solver to verify the feasibility of each path. Then,
program execution resumes and continues down all feasible paths. On each
path, the symbolic execution engine maintains a set of constraints, called the
path condition, which must hold for the execution of that path. For every
explored path, symbolic execution passes the path condition to a constraint
solver to create a test case with the respective input values that led execu-
tion on that path. Since program state is (logically) copied at each branch,
the symbolic execution engine can explore multiple paths simultaneously or
independently.
Like others [57], we observe that, to deal with loops, symbolic execu-
tion would potentially need to explore an unbounded number of paths. As
described in Section 2.5.2, we eﬀectively side-step this problem by exploit-
ing knowledge of the OpenFlow message grammar to construct inputs that
ensure we explore a bounded number of paths.
Therefore, symbolic execution is a powerful program analysis technique
— rather than having a linear execution where concrete values are used, sym-
bolic execution covers a tree of executions where symbolic values are used.
However, the usefulness of symbolic execution is limited by its scalability be-
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cause the number of paths through a program generally grows exponentially
in the number of branches on symbolic inputs. This problem is commonly
known as the “path explosion” problem. The path explosion is exacerbated
by the fact that the program under test interacts with its environment, e.g.,
by invoking OS system calls and calls to various library functions. External
functions present an additional problem if the symbolic execution engine does
not have visibility into their source code. A typical solution to this problem
is to abstract away the complexity of the underlying execution environment
using models. These models are typically a simpliﬁed implementation of a
certain subsystem such as ﬁle system, network communication, etc. Besides
using environment models to “scale” symbolic execution, it is possible and
often suﬃciently practical to selectively mark as symbolic only the inputs
that are relevant for the current analysis. As we show later in Section 2.5.2,
carefully mixing symbolic and concrete inputs is key to being able to sym-
bolically execute OpenFlow agents.
2.3 SOFT Overview
Our approach to automatically ﬁnding inconsistencies among OpenFlow agent
implementations is most easily introduced through an example.
Consider an input sequence that only includes one control message of
type Packet Out. This message instructs the OpenFlow agent to send out a
packet on port p, where p is a 16-bit unsigned integer that identiﬁes a speciﬁc
port or is equal to one of several preset constants (e.g., ﬂood the packet or
send to controller). For the sake of presentation, we assume that only p is
symbolic (i.e., p is the only part of this input that varies) and we omit the
case p = 0 (for which an error message would be produced).
We ﬁrst symbolically execute an OpenFlow agent implementation while
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if (p == OFPP_CTRL) {
  send_to_ctrl()
} else if (p < 25) {
  send_to_port(p)
} else {
  error(BAD_PORT);
}
if (p < 25) {
  send_to_port(p);
} else {
  error(BAD_PORT);
}
???
???
???
???
????
??????? ???????
????????????????
Figure 2.1: Example OpenFlow agents having diﬀerent
PACKET OUT message implementations.
feeding it with this input sequence. When executing symbolically, we auto-
matically partition the input space of p into several subspaces. Each subspace
is an equivalence class of inputs that, in this case, describes which values of
p follow the same code path. To make the point more tangible, consider
Agent 1 in Figure 2.1: if p ∈ [1, 24] the program executes the code path that
sends the packet on port p; if p = OFPP CTRL (the predeﬁned controller port)
the program executes a diﬀerent code path that encapsulates the packet in a
Packet In message and sends it to the controller; and so on. Besides deter-
mining the input space partition, we log the output results produced when
executing each code path (e.g., we log what packet comes out from which
port). Therefore, for each input subspace there exists a corresponding output
trace.
Next, we symbolically execute a diﬀerent OpenFlow agent implementa-
tion (Agent 2 in Figure 2.1) and determine the partitions of input space of
p. However, assume that this second OpenFlow agent does not support the
special port number OFPP CTRL. Instead, the program sends an error message
to the controller when it encounters this case. Likewise, we log the output
results produced when executing each code path.
At this point, we have two input space partitions (one for each OpenFlow
agent implementation), as depicted in Figure 2.2. Within each partition, we
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Figure 2.2: Input space partitions and inconsistency check.
then group the subspaces by output result (illustrated with diﬀerent colors
in Figure 2.2). That is, we merge together two subspaces (two code paths), if
they produce the same outputs. Such grouping results in two coarse-grained
input space partitions–one for each agent. Next, we consider the cross prod-
uct of the coarse-grained partitions (i.e., all pair-wise combinations of sub-
spaces between the two partitions). From the cross product, we exclude pairs
of subspaces that correspond to identical output results. Finally, we inter-
sect the two subspaces in every remaining pair. A non-empty intersection
deﬁnes a subspace of inputs that give diﬀerent results for diﬀerent OpenFlow
agents: this is an inconsistency. For each inconsistency we discover, we con-
struct a concrete test case that reproduces the observed results. Relative to
our current example, we identify that one inconsistency exists and, to repro-
duce it, we construct the example with input p = OFPP CTRL as illustrated
in Figure 2.2.
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2.4 Usage
It is impractical to assume that a tool for interoperability testing has access
to the source code of commercial OpenFlow implementations from all ven-
dors. Therefore, the goal is to make symbolic execution scale to crosscheck
diﬀerent OpenFlow implementations and ﬁnd interoperability issues without
having simultaneous access to all source codes. The proposed solution allows
switch vendors to use SOFT in two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, each vendor
independently runs SOFT on its OpenFlow agent implementation to produce
a set of intermediate results that contain the input space partitions and the
relative output results. One beneﬁt of this approach is that a vendor does
not require access to the code of other vendors.
In the second phase, SOFT collects and crosschecks these intermediate
results to identify inconsistencies. This phase can take place as a part of
an inter-vendor agreement (e.g., under an NDA), or during wider interop-
erability events [9]. Alternatively, a third-party organization such as Open
Networking Foundation (ONF) may conduct the tests.
While we focus the presentation of SOFT on interoperability testing,
we want to clarify that there exist other applications. For example, SOFT
can automate performing regression testing. In addition, it can be used to
compare against a well-known set of path conditions that are bootstrapped
from unit tests.
We observe that an OpenFlow agent is potentially a software component
of a hardware device. As such, some operations can install state directly in
the switching hardware (e.g., forwarding rules), seemingly outside of SOFT’s
reach. We note, however, that vendors typically have a way of running
their ﬁrmware inside a hardware emulator for testing purposes. We only
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require that the hardware emulator is integrated with the symbolic execution
engine. Previous work (e.g., [28]) demonstrates that it is indeed possible to
run complex software systems live, including closed-source device drivers.
2.5 Design
Our goal is to enable systematic exploration of inconsistencies across multiple
OpenFlow agent implementations. In other words, we want to ﬁnd whether
there exists any sequence of inputs under which one OpenFlow agent behaves
diﬀerently than another agent. To do this, we require a way of (i) construct-
ing sequences of test inputs that cover all possible executions for each Open-
Flow agent, and (ii) comparing the output results that each input produces
to identify inconsistencies.
We accomplish the subgoal of ﬁnding test inputs by using symbolic ex-
ecution. The outcome of symbolic execution is twofold: (i) a list of path
conditions, each of which summarizes the input constraints that must hold
during the execution of a given path, and (ii) a log of the observed output
results for each path executed.
We then identify inconsistencies by grouping the path conditions that
share the same output results on a per-agent basis and ﬁnding the input
subspaces that satisfy the conjunction of the path conditions. Figure 2.3
provides an illustration of the operation of SOFT as described above. In
the remainder of this section, we discuss our approach in detail. After a
brief description of a strawman approach for utilizing symbolic execution in
functional equivalence testing, we analyze improvements required to apply it
to complex software such as OpenFlow agents. Finally, we discuss how we
solve the second problem, namely collecting and comparing relevant outputs.
24
Figure 2.3: SOFT overview.
2.5.1 Automating Equivalence Testing
Our form of interoperability testing can be viewed as checking the func-
tional equivalence of diﬀerent OpenFlow agents at the interface level (i.e.,
the OpenFlow API). To understand how we can use symbolic execution for
this purpose, let us ﬁrst consider a simpler problem.
A strawman approach. Assume we have two functions that implement the
same algorithm diﬀerently and we want to test if they are indeed functionally
equivalent. To do this, it is suﬃcient to symbolically execute both functions
by passing identical symbolic inputs to both of them and checking whether
they return the same value. If the results diﬀer, the symbolic execution
engine can construct a test case to exercise the problematic code path. In
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essence, symbolic execution enables us to crosscheck the two functions’ results
through all possible execution paths. This simple approach is sound, i.e., it
identiﬁes all cases where results diﬀer, provided that symbolic execution can
solve all constraints it encounters. It is also relatively straightforward to
extend this approach to crosscheck console utility programs by running with
the same symbolic environment and comparing the data printed to stdout,
as shown in [24].
Challenges and approach. Scaling up this approach to our target system
is not an easy task. An OpenFlow agent is a non-terminating, event-driven
program that interacts intensely with its environment. In this case, the
environment consists of the network data plane, other switch components
(e.g., ﬂow tables) and the controller.
The ﬁrst challenge this raises is that the input space is inherently inﬁnite,
thus making the problem of comparing OpenFlow agents over unbounded
inputs intractable. Instead, to make our problem tractable, we must limit
the length of any input sequence used for testing.
Second, crosschecking the results of diﬀerent OpenFlow agents is challeng-
ing because there exists no notion of a “switch return value”. Furthermore,
there does not exist a universal stdout format that enables textual com-
parison unlike console utilities. Instead, we must collect a trace of switch
output results that enables comparison using detailed information from both
the OpenFlow and the data plane interfaces. In other words, we must for
example, capture packets and OpenFlow messages emitted by the switch,
and maintain a non-ambiguous representation of these events.
Finally, the approach above works by feeding both functions with the
same symbolic input. In turn, this requires that both agents be locally avail-
able. However, we cannot assume that SOFT will operate on diﬀerent Open-
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Flow agents at the same time. Instead, we make a conscious design choice
to decouple the symbolic execution phase from the crosschecking phase.
2.5.2 Creating Symbolic Inputs
An OpenFlow agent reacts to OpenFlow messages and data plane packets
it receives. Therefore, sequences of such messages can be considered inputs
to the agent. In this subsection, we only consider the control channel inputs
(the messages sent by the controller) because our goal is to test a switch at
the OpenFlow interface (and not the data plane interface).
2.5.2.1 Structuring Inputs
Feeding unstructured inputs is ineﬀective. As the input space con-
taining sequences of arbitrary numbers of arbitrary messages is inﬁnite, we
need to enforce the maximum length of the sequence. A straightforward
way to limit the input size would be to use N -byte symbolic inputs, with N
bounded. Unfortunately, this approach quickly hits the scalability limits of
exhaustive path exploration because these inputs do not contain any infor-
mation that is of either syntactic or semantic value. As a result, symbolic
execution must consider all possible ways in which these symbolic inputs can
be interpreted (most of which represent invalid inputs anyway) to exhaust
all paths. As an example, consider feeding an agent with the mentioned
sequence of N symbolic bytes. Since there exist diﬀerent types of control
messages, some of which have variable lengths, this stream of N bytes can
be parsed (depending on its content) as: one message of N bytes, or as any
combination of two messages whose lengths add up to N , or as combinations
of three messages, etc.
Moreover, some messages like Flow Mod and Packet Out, are variable
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in length. This is because they both contain the actions ﬁeld which is a
container type for possible combinations of forwarding actions. The major
issue arises as each individual action is itself variable in length. As such,
we are again in the situation where symbolic execution is left to explore all
possible combinations in which it can interpret N symbolic bytes as multiple
action items. Although individual lengths must be multiple of 8 bytes to be
valid, the combinatorial growth quickly becomes impractical.
Structuring the inputs improves scalability. We overcome the afore-
mentioned problems by using a ﬁnite number of ﬁnite-size inputs. Most
importantly, we construct inputs that adhere to valid format boundaries of
OpenFlow control messages rather than leaving symbolic execution to guess
the correct sizes. This means that we feed the agent with one symbolic con-
trol message at a time and pass the actual message length as a concrete
value in the appropriate header ﬁeld. In practice, we must also make the
message type concrete before establishing a valid message length, as the lat-
ter is essentially determined by the former. This is not an issue, since every
message must be identiﬁed by a valid code (at present about 20 codes exist,
all described in the protocol speciﬁcations, e.g., [11]). In a similar fashion,
for messages that have variable length actions, we predetermine the number
of action items and the relative lengths as concrete values.
2.5.2.2 Choosing the Size of Inputs
As we choose to limit the size of inputs, the immediate question we face is
up to what input size is it practical to symbolically execute an OpenFlow
agent, given today’s technology? Indeed, it is known that the scalability
of symbolic execution is limited by the path explosion problem: i.e., the
number of feasible paths can grow exponentially with the size of the inputs
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and number of branches. On the other hand, to make testing meaningful,
the chosen inputs need to provide satisfactory coverage of agent’s code and
functionality. In practice, we seek answers through empirical observations.
The input size varies along two dimensions: (i) number of symbolic control
messages, and (ii) number of symbolic bytes in each message.
Covering the input space of each message is generally feasible. We
ﬁrst explore to what extent the number of symbolic bytes in each message
represents a hurdle to our approach. As we discuss below, we ﬁnd that the
overhead to exhaustively cover the input space of each message is generally
acceptable, given the current protocol speciﬁcations. We already mentioned
that the message length depends in the ﬁrst place on the message type. It
should also be clear that the processing code and especially the processing
complexity varies across message types. For example, it is trivial to sym-
bolically execute a message of type Hello, which contains no message body.
On the other hand, the Flow Mod message, which drives modiﬁcations to
the ﬂow table, carries tens of data ﬁelds that need validation and ultimately
determine what actions the switch will perform. Indeed, we observe through
experimentation that the number of feasible paths varies signiﬁcantly be-
tween diﬀerent message types (two orders of magnitude between Flow Mod
and Packet Out messages). Most importantly, symbolic execution runs to
completion in all cases when testing with the reference OpenFlow switch
implementation.1
Achieving good coverage requires just two symbolic messages. How-
ever, the question remains about how many symbolic control messages we
should inject in practice. Again, the answer depends on what type of mes-
sages one considers. We ﬁnd that for complex messages we can at most use
1Our experimental setup is introduced in Section 2.7.
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Figure 2.4: Reference switch code coverage as a function of the
number of symbolic messages injected.
a sequence of three messages. This number may seem small, but it is worth
noting that we do not need long message sequences for the type of testing we
target. In fact, one symbolic message is already suﬃcient to cover all feasible
code paths involved in message processing. With the subsequent message,
we augment the coverage to include additional paths that depend on parts of
switch state that are rendered symbolic as a result of running with the ﬁrst
symbolic message. Eﬀectively, the second message enables us to explore the
cross-interactions of message pairs. In addition, such interactions exist only
for a small fraction of possible message type combinations. For example,
two Flow Mod messages may aﬀect the same part of the switch state; that
is not true for Echo Request followed by Flow Mod. As such, the increase
in instruction coverage due to the second message is a fraction of what the
ﬁrst message covers. A third message does not signiﬁcantly improve coverage
further as shown in Figure 2.4. Thus, careful consideration of inputs is key
to successfully achieving our goals through symbolic execution.
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2.5.2.3 Deﬁning Relevant Input Sequences
Exploiting domain speciﬁc knowledge is essential to construct input sequences
that target interesting uses of OpenFlow messages to further reduce the test-
ing overhead. First, although the protocol speciﬁcations deﬁne about 20
messages, some of these are clearly more important than others. For exam-
ple, the Hello and Echo messages are simple connection establishment and
keep-alive messages, respectively. We focus on complex messages such as
Flow Mod, Packet Out, Set Config that require validation and modify the
state of an agent. We also note that because these messages are meant to
aﬀect diﬀerent functional aspects of the agent, we ﬁnd it unnecessarily time-
consuming to check all pair-wise combinations of these messages. Section 2.7
details the actual sequences of messages we use for testing.
2.5.3 Collecting Output Results
So far we have shown how our approach uses exhaustive path exploration to
obtain the input space partitions (or equivalence classes of inputs). However,
we still need to know what end result each partition produces because only
the results enable the comparison across diﬀerent OpenFlow agents.
As we feed a symbolic message to an OpenFlow agent, its state might be
updated. Additionally, there are two possible outcomes: (i) the agent outputs
some data (i.e., messages back to the controller or data plane packets), or
(ii) the agent does not produce externally observable data. In this work we
treat only data explicitly returned by an agent (OpenFlow messages and data
plane packets) as an output. Instead of directly fetching the internal state,
we use additional packets and messages to infer the impact of the state on
agent’s behavior.
Capturing output data. To collect the outputs, we make use of the
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OpenFlow and data plane interfaces to capture data. Speciﬁcally, we log
all OpenFlow messages and packets emitted by the agent. Note that the
entire analysis runs in software (the output data may even contain symbolic
inputs); therefore, with data plane interface we simply mean the socket API
(or equivalent) that the agent uses to send packets.
Using concrete packets for probing state. Regardless of whether the
agent does or does not output data, we cannot immediately determine if
the symbolic message caused any internal state change (e.g., the Flow Mod
message installs a new rule in the ﬂow table). Diﬀerences in the internal
state do not necessarily result in diﬀerences in observed behavior. Moreover,
we want to avoid directly fetching an agent’s internal state as this would
add a dependency on the speciﬁc implementation. As a solution, following
any potentially state changing symbolic message, we inject a concrete packet
through the data plane interface as a simple state probe. The eﬀect of this
probe is that it enables symbolic execution to exercise the code that matches
incoming packets and the code that applies the forwarding actions. The
probe packet is then either forwarded (to a port or controller), in which case
we log it, or it is dropped, in which case we log an empty probe response.
Normalizing results. Rather than saving the logs verbatim, we normalize
the output results to remove certain data from the results for which spu-
rious diﬀerences are expected. For example, the buﬀer identiﬁers used by
diﬀerent agents may diﬀer and such a diﬀerence should not be considered an
inconsistency.
2.5.4 Finding Inconsistencies
In this phase, we seek to ﬁnd inconsistencies between two OpenFlow agents
denoted A and B.
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With respect to agent A, we denote with PCA the set of path conditions
(outcome of symbolic execution). For each pc ∈ PCA, let resA(pc) be the
normalized output result when executing the path represented by pc. We
denote the set of distinct output results as RESA.
Grouping paths by output results. Our ﬁrst step is to group all diﬀerent
path conditions that produce the same output result. Formally, ∀r ∈ RESA
we set CA(r) =
∨{pc | pc ∈ PCA; resA(pc) = r} to be the disjunction of all
path conditions that share the same output result. PCB, RESB, and CB are
similarly deﬁned.
Intersecting input subspaces. In our second and last step, for each pair
of diﬀerent outputs of agents A and B, we check if there exists at least one
common input that leads to these inconsistent outputs. For each pair (i, j)
of results i ∈ RESA, j ∈ RESB such that i = j, we query a satisﬁability
solver (STP [36]) to obtain an example test case that satisﬁes the condition
CA(i)
∧
CB(j). If the solver can satisfy this conjunction, then we have an
inconsistency.
Discussion. It is easy to note that an upper bound of the number of
queries to the solver for our approach is |RESA| · |RESB|. In addition,
note that our approach produces only one inconsistency example per pair
of diﬀerent output results. In other words, we do not provide one example
for each path that produces the inconsistency. If this is desired, one can
omit grouping all paths that share the same output. However, doing so has
an inherent overhead cost because it increases the number of STP queries.
Instead, our approach amortizes the start-up costs of a multitude of solver
invocations by using fewer larger queries and enables the solver to apply
built-in optimizations to handle such larger queries.
As with any bug ﬁnding tool, it is important to know whether our ap-
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proach may report false positives/negatives. We observe that SOFT does
not produce false positives: each identiﬁed inconsistency is an evidence of
divergent behavior. Note that this does not necessarily mean that one agent
does something in violation to the speciﬁcations. According to our previous
deﬁnition, an inconsistency is reported if the tested agents perform diﬀerent
actions when exposed to the same input. However, the tool might have false
negatives for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that our path coverage may not be
complete. For instance, symbolic execution might not cover all feasible paths
due to path explosion. The second is that all agent implementations under
test might contain the same bug, and therefore produce the same output.
2.6 Implementation Details
We built our SOFT prototype on top of the Cloud9 [23] symbolic execution
engine. SOFT consists of three major components: (i) a test harness, which
drives the testing of OpenFlow agents, (ii) a grouping tool to group path
conditions that share output results, and (iii) a tool for ﬁnding inconsisten-
cies.
2.6.1 Test Harness and Cloud9
To provide the necessary execution environment for the OpenFlow agent, we
build a test harness that emulates both a remote controller and the underlying
network. The emulated controller is capable of injecting symbolic inputs.
As a symbolic execution engine, Cloud9 can symbolically execute only a
single binary. We therefore create a test “driver” by linking the OpenFlow
agent and our test harness controller together. Upon startup, the test driver
forks into two processes, one of which runs the OpenFlow agent while the
second runs the test harness itself. The two processes are connected via
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standard UNIX sockets. Upon startup, the OpenFlow agent connects to the
test harness. After the connection setup and exchange of the initial Hello
messages, the test harness injects a sequence of several symbolic OpenFlow
messages and/or probes, one at a time (we discuss the input sequences in
more details in Section 2.7). Upon conﬁrming that the switch processed all
messages and probes, we kill the execution.
To use Cloud9 for our goal, we had to improve its environment model.
Cloud9 provides a symbolic model of the POSIX environment. Such a model,
most importantly, allows us to eﬃciently use the socket API without access-
ing the entire networking stack. As a result, all symbolic variables remain
symbolic after being transferred as data in a packet. However, such a model
needs to provide all functions used by the tested application. Notably, we
needed to implement the RAW socket API which was missing in Cloud9 but
is used by the OpenFlow agents in our tests. Moreover, we replace or simplify
some library functions as described next.
We assume that the agents correctly use network versus host byte order-
ing, and we change functions ntoh and hton to simply return their argument
unchanged. This simpliﬁes constraints by removing double-shuﬄing (ﬁrst
when the test harness creates a message, second when the OpenFlow agent
parses the message). We also simplify checksum and hash functions to return
constants or identities, because they cannot be reversed or it is computation-
ally very expensive to do so (this is a well-known issue in using a constraint
solver). The aforementioned modiﬁcations reduce complexity and improve
symbolic execution eﬃciency.
Finally, the symbolic execution engine may use several search strategies
that prioritize diﬀerent goals while exploring the program. We choose to
use the default Cloud9 strategy that is an interleaving of a random path
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choice and a strategy that aims to improve coverage. However, the choice of
the search strategy has small impact on our tool. By controlling the inputs
we tend to exhaustively cover all possible execution paths, which in turn
diminishes the impact of choosing a particular search strategy. Moreover,
SOFT is capable of working with traces that are only partially covering
agents’ code.
2.6.2 Tools
Apart from the test harness, we provide two tools for manipulating Cloud9
results. Both of these tools are written in C++ and heavily reuse existing
Cloud9 code for reading, writing and manipulating path conditions. The
tools contain less than 200 lines of new code in total.
The group tool reads multiple ﬁles (results of Cloud9 execution), iden-
tiﬁes diﬀerent output results and groups the path conditions by result. To
improve performance of further constraint parsing, we group path conditions
by building a balanced binary tree minimizing the depth of nested expres-
sions. The inconsistency ﬁnder tool expects two directories holding grouped
results as its arguments. The tool iterates over all combinations of diﬀerent
results and queries the STP solver to check for inconsistencies. If there is
an inconsistency (the condition is satisﬁable), the STP solver provides an
example set of variables that satisfy the condition. This is a test case that
can be used to understand and trace the root cause of the inconsistency and
verify if a behavior is erroneous.
2.7 Evaluation
We evaluate SOFT using two publicly available OpenFlow agents compatible
with the speciﬁcations in version 1.0. The ﬁrst one is a reference OpenFlow
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Test Description
Packet Out A single Packet Out message containing a symbolic ac-tion and a symbolic output action.
Stats Request A single symbolic Stats Req. It covers all possiblestatistics requests.
Set Conﬁg A symbolic Set Config message followed by a probingTCP packet.
FlowMod A symbolic Flow Mod with 1 symbolic action and a sym-bolic output action followed by a probing TCP packet.
Eth FlowMod
Symbolic Flow Mod with 1 symbolic action and a sym-
bolic output action. Fields not related to Ethernet are
concretized. The message is followed by a probing Eth-
ernet packet.
CS FlowMods 2 Flow Mod. The ﬁrst one is concrete, the second issymbolic.
Concrete 4 concrete 8-byte messages. These are the messages thatdo not have variable ﬁelds.
Short Symb A 10-byte symbolic message. Only the OpenFlow ver-sion ﬁeld is concrete.
Table 2.1: Tests used in the evaluation.
switch implementation written in C released with version 1.0 of the speciﬁca-
tions. Its main purpose is to clarify the speciﬁcations and present available
features. Although the reference implementation is not designed for high
performance, it is expected to be correct as others will build upon and test
against it. We are referring to this version as Reference Switch (55K lines
of code). The second is Open vSwitch 1.0.0 [10] (80K lines of code). It is a
production quality virtual switch written in C and used as a base for several
commercial switches.2 OpenFlow is just one the supported protocols. We
also created a third OpenFlow agent by modifying the Reference Switch and
introducing diﬀerent corner case behaviors (Modiﬁed Switch). This way we
can tell how eﬃciently SOFT ﬁnds the injected diﬀerences and which of them
remain unnoticed.
To evaluate SOFT we use the set of tests summarized in Table 2.1. We
run our experiments using a machine with Linux 3.2.0 x86 64 that has 128
2For example, in Pica8 products: http://www.pica8.org/.
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GB of RAM and a clock speed of 2.4 GHz. Our implementation does not use
multiple cores for a single experiment.
2.7.1 Can SOFT Identify Inconsistencies?
In this section, we report and analyze the inconsistencies SOFT detects. We
apply a set of tests to all three OpenFlow agents and compare Reference
Switch with both Modiﬁed Switch and Open vSwitch.
2.7.1.1 Modiﬁed Switch vs. Reference Switch
First, we look for diﬀerences between Reference Switch and Modiﬁed Switch.
Two team members who did not take part in the tool’s implementation and
test preparation were designated to introduce a few modiﬁcations to the Ref-
erence Switch. The modiﬁcations were meant to aﬀect the externally visible
behavior of the OpenFlow agent. Having purposefully injected changes, we
set out to check how many can be detected by SOFT.
SOFT is able to correctly pinpoint 5 out of 7 injected modiﬁcations.
We further investigate the cases in which SOFT failed to ﬂag the eﬀect of
the diﬀerences. It turns out that one of them concerns the Hello message
received while establishing a connection to the controller. SOFT does not
recognize this problem because it establishes a correct connection ﬁrst and
then performs the tests. The second missed modiﬁcation manifests itself
only when a rule is deleted because of a timeout. This occurs because the
symbolic execution engine is not able to trigger timers. As part of our future
work, we plan to extend our approach to deal with time, e.g., similarly to
MODIST [82].
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2.7.1.2 Open vSwitch vs. Reference Switch
Knowing that SOFT is capable of ﬁnding inconsistencies, we compare the
Reference Switch with Open vSwitch to verify how useful SOFT is when
applied to a production quality OpenFlow agent. The list of diﬀerences
between the two major software agents contains a few signiﬁcant ones. In
the following, we present the observed inconsistencies and analyze their root
causes.
Packet dropped when action is invalid. This case describes a Packet
Out message containing a packet that is silently dropped by Open vSwitch
while the Reference Switch forwards it. The inconsistency appears when the
Packet Out control message satisﬁes the following conditions: (i) it contains
the packet that the agent should forward and (ii) one of the actions is setting
the value of VLAN or IP Type of Service ﬁeld. Further investigation leads us
to the conclusion that Open vSwitch validates whether a new VLAN value
set by the action ﬁts in 12 bits and similarly whether the last two bits of the
TOS value are equal to 0. When an action speciﬁed in the message does not
pass this strict validation, Open vSwitch silently ignores the whole message.
Additional tests with Flow Mod messages reveal a similar issue. These tests
also show that the vlan pcp ﬁeld undergoes additional validation in Open
vSwitch. Reference Switch does not validate values of the aforementioned
ﬁelds, but it automatically modiﬁes them to ﬁt the expected format.
The speciﬁcations do not state that the OpenFlow agent should perform
such a precise validation of any of the mentioned ﬁelds. Therefore, both
implementations might be considered correct. However, such a diﬀerence in
behavior might cause unexpected packet drops if the controller developers
test their applications with switches that are diﬀerent from those deployed
in the network.
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Forwarding a packet to an invalid port. Here we describe a case in
which the tested OpenFlow agents return error messages concerning incorrect
output ports in an inconsistent fashion. According to the speciﬁcations, the
agent has to return an error message if the output port will never be valid.
However, if the port may become valid in the future, the message might
either be rejected with an error, or the agent may drop packets intended for
this port while it is not valid. The diﬀerences in interpretation when the port
will be invalid forever lead to a few diﬀerences between OpenFlow agents.
First, when the ingress port in the match is equal to the output port, the
Reference Switch returns an error, as no packets will ever be forwarded to
this port.3 Open vSwitch accepts such a rule and drops all matching packets.
On the other hand, Open vSwitch immediately returns an error when the
action deﬁnes an output port greater than a conﬁgurable maximum value.
Reference Switch does not validate ports this way.
Thus, if the controller application relies on error messages received, it may
misbehave when deployed with a diﬀerent agent than it was tested with. If
the agent used in testing considered a port valid but the other agent did
not, the controller would fail to install rules it was designed to install. The
opposite situation is equally unsafe. The rule installation that used to return
an error succeeds, but all matching packets get dropped. As a result, some
packets will not to be sent to the controller, although they were expected to
be. Moreover, such a rule may cover another, lower priority one.
Lack of error messages. We have already presented a few cases when
one of the agents silently drops the incorrect message without returning an
error. SOFT detects another instance of such a problem in the Reference
Switch while testing with Packet Out and Flow Mod messages. When the
3A special OFPP IN PORT port must be explicitly used to forward packets back to the port
they came from [11].
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buffer id ﬁeld refers to a non-existent buﬀer, the Reference Switch handles
the message but does not apply actions to any packet and does not report
any error. Open vSwitch replies with an error message, but installs the ﬂow
as well. We analyzed the Reference Switch source code and discovered that
although the error is returned by the message handler, it is not propagated
further as an OpenFlow message.
OpenFlow agent terminates with an error. There are three indepen-
dent cases when the Reference Switch crashes. First, when the OpenFlow
agent receives a Packet Out message with output port set to OFPP CTRL.
This may be a rare case (e.g., when the developer demands such behavior)
but it is not forbidden by the speciﬁcations. Second, when the agent ex-
ecutes an action setting the vlan ﬁeld in a Packet Out message the same
error appears and the agent crashes. Finally, when the agent receives a queue
conﬁguration request for port number 0, it encounters a memory error. All
the aforementioned problems are not only inconsistencies, but also major
reliability problems in the OpenFlow agent.
Diﬀerent order of message validation. In this case, the order in which
message ﬁelds should be validated is not made explicit in the speciﬁcations.
This vagueness results in externally visible diﬀerences in agents’ behavior.
The same incorrect message may induce two diﬀerent error messages, or an
error message and a lack of response in case of the mentioned problem. We
encountered such a situation for a Packet Out message with an incorrect
buﬀer id and output port.
Statistics requests silently ignored. The Reference Switch silently ig-
nores requests for statistics to which it is not able to respond. This behavior
is a speciﬁc case of the “Lack of error messages” problem. Even though the
handler returns an error it is not converted to an OpenFlow message. The
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problem was detected because Open vSwitch sends an error in response to
an invalid or unknown request.
Missing features. SOFT is able to detect features that are missing in
one OpenFlow agent, but are present in the other. We were able to au-
tomatically infer that Open vSwitch does not support emergency ﬂow en-
tries that are deﬁned in the speciﬁcations. Secondly, Reference Switch being
purely an OpenFlow switch, does not support the traditional forwarding
paths (OFPP NORMAL).
2.7.2 What is the Overhead of Using SOFT?
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of the two key stages
of SOFT’s execution.
Symbolic execution. In the ﬁrst stage, the OpenFlow agent is symboli-
cally executed with an input sequence and SOFT gathers path constraints
and corresponding outputs. For all three OpenFlow agents we report the
running time, as well as the number and size (number of boolean operations
in a path condition) of paths (equivalence classes of inputs) in Table 2.2.
These metrics are strongly variable and depend not only on the input length
but also on the message type. Moreover, adding a second message or a probe
packet signiﬁcantly increases complexity by orders of magnitude. Addition-
ally, Open vSwitch–the most complex of the tested agents–is noticeably more
challenging for symbolic execution (we note that it is possible to use even
partial results of symbolic execution to look for inconsistencies). As a result
of multiple additional validations, the test input space for Open vSwitch is
partitioned into 3-15 times more subspaces than for the Reference Switch.
Subspaces intersections. We distinguish between two sub-stages of the
second stage: (i) grouping input subspaces by the same output, (ii) inter-
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Grouping results Inconsistency
Test Reference Switch Open vSwitch checking
time #res time #res time #
Packet Out 0.038s 6 0.090s 10 26s 14
Stats Request 0.116s 8 0.061s 9 10s 7
Set Conﬁg 0.141s 69 0.43s 69 236s 0
Eth FlowMod 8s 12 23s 31 23m 58
CS FlowMods 79s 4 344m 6 >28h ≥8
Short Symb 0.039s 9 0.01s 7 6s 4
Table 2.3: Time needed to ﬁnd overlapping input subspaces and
number of created test cases. Each test case represents one inter-
section of overlapping input subspaces. Additionally, time needed
to group constraints by the output and a number of distinct out-
puts for Reference Switch and Open vSwitch.
secting subspaces corresponding to potential inconsistencies.
For the ﬁrst sub-stage we report the time required to group and the
number of distinct outputs. As presented in Table 2.3, this part requires
orders of magnitude less time than symbolic execution. Grouping constraints
dramatically reduces the number of expressions that need to be checked for
satisﬁability, as there are only up to 30 distinct outputs (a 1-5 orders of
magnitude reduction compared to the initial number of equivalence classes).
The search for overlapping subspaces depends on the complexity of con-
straints and usually ﬁnishes within a couple of minutes. There is one excep-
tional case in which the STP solver is unable to solve the merged constraints
in one day. In the future we plan to investigate grouping constraints into
smaller groups for such cases.
The achieved results in ﬁnding inconsistencies conﬁrm our expectations.
Usually one diﬀerence manifests itself multiple times and aﬀects many sub-
spaces of inputs. In the extreme example, although there are 58 reported
inconsistencies, manual analysis reveals only 6 distinct root causes of diﬀer-
ences.
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Reference Switch Open vSwitch
Test Inst.(%) Branch(%) Inst.(%) Branch(%)
No Message 12.21 8.27 19.03 13.34
Packet Out 26.23 19.31 25.68 17.28
Stats Request 30.27 24.15 24.31 16.75
Set Conﬁg 26.23 19.31 23.98 16.16
Eth FlowMod 41.74 34.65 38.15 25.49
FlowMod 42.65 34.25 38.24 26.27
Concrete 17.13 11.42 20.16 13.62
Short Symb 19.92 13.39 21.60 14.34
Table 2.4: Instruction and branch coverage for selected tests for
Reference Switch and Open vSwitch.
2.7.3 How Relevant is Input Sequence Selection?
To quantify the relevance of chosen tests, we measure the instruction and
branch coverage provided by Cloud9. The instruction/branch reached at
least once in the execution is considered covered, regardless of its arguments.
We consider only the sections of OpenFlow agent’s code relevant to Open-
Flow processing. The initialization that is repeated for each test covers 12%
of instructions and 8% of branches. The test speciﬁc results, shown in Ta-
ble 2.4, are spread between 20 and 40%. To verify that the low reported
coverage is a result of the fact that each test targets a few speciﬁc message
handlers, we manually analyze cumulative coverage of all tests. We observe
that SOFT covers approximately 75% of the code and that the remaining
instructions belong mostly to code that is not accessible in standard execu-
tion (e.g., command line conﬁguration, dead code, cleanup functions, logging
functions).
The importance of concretizing inputs. Due to time and memory con-
straints it is often convenient to concretize selected ﬁelds in the message. We
evaluate the beneﬁts and drawbacks of using the domain knowledge to re-
duce the input space. As a baseline, we choose a test where a single symbolic
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Test Time Paths Coverage
Fully Symbolic 31h 226224 42.93%
Concrete Match 12m 2634 40.60%
Concrete Action 193m 30396 37.32%
Concrete Probe 48m 9216 41.6%
Symbolic Probe 172m 33168 43.9%
Table 2.5: Eﬀects of concretizing on execution time, generated
paths and instruction coverage.
Flow Mod message containing 2 symbolic actions and 2 symbolic output ac-
tions is followed by a TCP probe packet. We then compare the results of: (i)
the baseline, (ii) a version of the baseline with a concrete match (wildcard),
and (iii) a version of the baseline with a single concrete action instead of 4
symbolic ones. All values are summarized in the upper part of Table 2.5.
While the drop in the coverage percentage is only 2-5% in comparison to the
baseline test, the diﬀerence in time and path count is noticeable. Speciﬁ-
cally, the tests ﬁnish 10 to 50 times quicker, while generating 1 to 2 orders
of magnitude less paths.
To verify how much coverage we lose by not using symbolic probes, we
create a separate test. This test ﬁrst installs a partially symbolic Flow Mod
that applies actions to Ethernet packets. It then sends a short probe packet
that is concrete or symbolic depending on the test version. Results in the
lower part of Table 2.5 show that a symbolic probe adds just 2% to the
coverage. The cost is 3.5 times longer running time and 3.5 times more
paths.
To summarize, concretizing parts of the inputs signiﬁcantly reduces the
time needed to conduct the test at the cost of leaving small portion of addi-
tional instructions uncovered. Therefore, it is possible to use the concretized
inputs to conduct regular tests more often. When combined with careful
choice of concrete ﬁelds, the coverage is marginally aﬀected. The fully sym-
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bolic messages can be used just for the ﬁnal checks before a major release
when the best coverage possible is required, and testing time is less of an
issue.
2.8 Summary
By combining symbolic execution with a novel use of constraint solvers,
SOFT automatically determines functional diﬀerences between software agents
running on switches. Applying the tool to two existing software switches re-
veals several inconsistencies. While some of them are a result of a buggy
implementation, there are cases where agents diverge because of diﬀerences
in interpreting ambiguous portions of the speciﬁcation.
Finally, although the work presented in this chapter is centered around
the speciﬁc details of OpenFlow, the approach is more general and can be
applied to other router software and heterogeneous networked systems.
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Chapter 3
Detecting Performance Diﬀerences
This chapter presents a methodology to detect performance related diﬀer-
ences between switches. These issues manifest themselves only in the run-
ning devices and cannot be uncovered by methods that are relying on static
analysis of switch software such as the one presented in Chapter 2. The
methodology is based on systematic exploration of control plane message se-
quences sent to the devices, while monitoring the data plane behavior. The
main focus of this chapter is on rule update performance, while measuring
maximum data plane packet forwarding rates stays outside of its scope.
Applying the methodology to six hardware switches allows us to detect
two general inconsistency types. In this chapter, we ﬁrst expose behaviors
that do not follow the speciﬁcation, and if unnoticed, may lead to unsafe
networks. Then, we present a detailed overview of rule update performance
characteristics depending on various parameters. Each non-obvious ﬁnding
is expanded with further experimental investigation, a hypothesis and, if
possible, switch vendor comments.
3.1 Measurement Methodology
This section describes the methodology we follow to design the benchmarks
that assess control and data plane update performance of switches under
test.
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3.1.1 Tools and Experimental Setup
In this study we focus on two metrics describing switch behavior: ﬂow table
rule update rate and correspondence between control plane and data plane
views. The second metric is quantiﬁed by the time gap between when the
switch conﬁrms a rule modiﬁcation and when the modiﬁed rule starts aﬀect-
ing packets. We designed a general methodology that allows for systematic
exploration of switch behaviors under various conditions. At the beginning
of each experiment, we prepopulate the switch ﬂow table with R rules. Un-
less otherwise speciﬁed, the rules are non-overlapping and have the default
priority. Each rule matches a ﬂow based on a pair of IP source-destination
addresses, and forwards packets to switch port α. For clarity, we identify
ﬂows using contiguous integer numbers starting from −R + 1. According to
this notation, the prepopulated rules match ﬂows in the range −R + 1 to 0,
inclusive.
After initializing the switch’s hardware ﬂow table, we perform ﬂow table
updates and measure their behaviors. In particular, we send B batches of rule
updates, each batch consisting of: BD rule deletions, BM rule modiﬁcations
and BA rule insertions. Each batch is followed by a barrier request. In the
default setup, we set BD = BA = 1 and BM = 0. If BD is greater than 0,
batch i deletes rules matching ﬂows with numbers between−R+1+(i−1)∗BD
and −R + i ∗ BD. If BA is greater than 0, batch i installs rules that match
ﬂows with numbers in range between (i−1)∗BA+1 and i∗BA and forwards
packets to port α. As a result, each batch removes the oldest rules. Note that
the total number of rules in the table remains stable during most experiments
(in contrast to previous work such as [59] and [72] that measure only the time
needed to ﬁll an empty table).
To measure data plane state, in some experiments, we inject and cap-
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ture data plane traﬃc. We send packets that belong to ﬂows Fstart to Fend
(inclusive) at a rate of about 300 packets per ﬂow per second.
In our study, we have explored a wide range of possible parameters for
our methodology. For brevity, in the next sections, we highlight results where
we instantiate the methodology with speciﬁc parameters that led to interest-
ing observations. In the experiment descriptions we call the setup described
above with BD = BA = 1, BM = 0 and all rules with equal priority as a
general experimental setup. Finally, unless an experiment shows variance
greater than 5% across runs, we repeat it three times and report the aver-
age. Because the results have a small deviation across runs, unless otherwise
speciﬁed, we do not show conﬁdence intervals.
Measurement tool: Based on our initial investigation, as well as previously
reported results [44], we identify three main requirements for a measurement
tool: (i) ﬂexibility, (ii) portability, and (iii) suﬃcient precision. First, since
the switches we test are often in remote locations with limited physical access,
the measuring tool cannot use customized hardware (e.g., FPGAs). More-
over, our previous experience suggests that switches behave unexpectedly,
and thus we need to tailor the experiments to locate and dissect problems.
Finally, as the tested switches can modify at most a few thousands of rules
per second, we assume that a millisecond measurement precision is suﬃcient.
To achieve the aforementioned goals, we built a tool that consists of three
major components that correspond to the three benchmarking phases: input
generation, measurement and data analysis (Figure 3.1).
First, an input generator creates control plane rule modiﬁcation lists and
data plane packet traces used for the measurements. Unless otherwise speci-
ﬁed, the forwarding rules used for the experiments match traﬃc based on IP
source/destination pairs and forward packets to a single switch port. More-
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Figure 3.1: Overview of our measurement tools and testbed setup.
over, we notice that some switches can optimize rule updates aﬀecting the
same rule; we therefore make sure that modiﬁcations aﬀect diﬀerent rules.
To ensure this, by default, we use consecutive IPs for matches. Furthermore,
we cross-check our results using random matches and update patterns.
We refer to the control plane measurement engine as the controller as
it emulates the behavior of an OpenFlow controller. We implement it using
NOX [6] and ROFL [13] libraries that can issue rule updates at a much higher
rate than what the hardware switches can handle.1 The engine records time
of various interactions with the switch (e.g., ﬂow modiﬁcation sent, barrier
reply received) and saves all its outputs into ﬁles. We additionally record
all control plane traﬃc using tcpdump. We rely on existing tcpreplay and
tcpdump tools to both send packets based on a pcap ﬁle and record them. To
remove time synchronization issues, we follow a simple testbed setup with the
switch connected to a single host on multiple interfaces — the host handles
the control plane as well as generates and receives traﬃc for the data plane.
Note that we do not need to fully saturate the switch data plane, and thus a
1Our benchmark with software OpenVSwitch handles ∼42000 updates/s.
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conventional host is capable of handling all of these tasks at the same time.
Finally, a modular analysis engine reads the output ﬁles and computes
the metrics of interest. Modularity means that we can add a new module to
analyze a diﬀerent aspect of the measured data. We implement the analysis
engine as a collection of Python modules.
Switches under test: We benchmark three ASIC-based switches capable
of OpenFlow 1.0 and two ASIC-based switches capable of OpenFlow 1.3
support: HP ProCurve 5406zl with K.15.10.0009 ﬁrmware, Pica8 P-3290
with PicOS 2.0.4, Dell PowerConnect 8132F with beta2 OpenFlow support,
Switch X and Switch Y. They use ProVision, Broadcom Firebolt, Broadcom
Trident+, Switch X and Switch Y ASICs, respectively. We additionally
compare how Switch X behaves with two ﬁrmware versions: V1 and V2.
We anonymize two of the switches since we did not get a permission to use
their names from their respective vendors. These switches have two types
of forwarding tables: software and hardware. While hardware ﬂow table
sizes (about 1500, 2000, 750, 4500, and 2000 rules, respectively) and levels
of OpenFlow support vary, we make sure that all test rules ultimately end
up in the hardware tables. Moreover, some switches implement a combined
mode where packet forwarding is done by both hardware and software, but
this imposes high load on the switch’s CPU and provides lower forwarding
performance. Thus, we avoid studying this operating mode. Further, as
mentioned before, analyzing the data plane forwarding performance is out
of scope of this work. We also benchmark NoviSwitch 1132 — a network-
processor based, OpenFlow 1.3 switch running ﬁrmware version 300.0.1.3
Each of its 64 ﬂow tables ﬁts over 4000 rules. We caution that the results for
2There are plans to optimize and productize this software.
3We repeated our tests with ﬁrmware 300.0.5 but observed similar results. We brieﬂy
describe bigger diﬀerences when compared to earlier ﬁrmware versions in Section 3.2.3.
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this switch may not directly compare to those of the other measured devices
due to the diﬀerent switch architecture. In particular, our methodology
correctly characterizes the update rates of ﬂow tables but does not establish
a relation between ﬂow table occupancy and maximum forwarding speed, for
which ASICs and network processor might exhibit diﬀerent behaviors.
Finally, since switches we test are located in diﬀerent institutions, there
are small diﬀerences between the testing machines and the network perfor-
mance. However, the set-ups are comparable. A testing computer is always
a server class machine and the network RTT varies between 0.1 and 0.5 ms.
3.2 Results: Flow Table Consistency
While the only view the controller has of the switch is through the control
plane, the real traﬃc forwarding happens in the data plane. In this sec-
tion we present the results of experiments where we monitor rule updates in
the control plane and at the same time send traﬃc to exercise the updated
rules. The unexpected behavior we report in this section may have negative
implications for network security and controller correctness.
3.2.1 Synchronicity of Control and Data Planes
Many solutions essential for correct and reliable OpenFlow deployments
(e.g., [60, 70]) rely on knowing when the switch applied a given command
in the data plane . The natural method to get such information is the barrier
message.Therefore, it is crucial that this message works correctly. However,
as authors of [72] already hinted, the state of the data plane may be diﬀerent
than the one advertised by the control plane. Thus we set out to measure
how these two views correspond to each other at a ﬁne granularity.
We use the default setup extended with one match-all low priority rule
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Switch Data plane
Switch X, ﬁrmware V1 falls behind indeﬁnitely. Up to 4 minutes in
our experiments.
Switch X, ﬁrmware V2 in sync with control plane
HP 5406zl often falls behind up to 250 ms. Indeﬁnitely
in corner cases (up to 22 s in our tests).
Pica8 P-3290 reorders + behind up to 400 ms
Dell 8132F in sync with control plane
Switch Y in sync with control plane
NoviSwitch 1132 in sync with control plane
Table 3.1: Data plane synchronicity key ﬁndings summary.
that drops all packets4 and we inject data plane ﬂows number Fstart to Fend.
For each update batch i we measure the time when the controller receives a
barrier reply for this batch and when the ﬁrst packet of ﬂow i reaches the
destination.
Figure 3.2 shows the results for R = 300, B = 300, Fstart = 1 and Fend =
100. There are three types of behavior that we observe: desynchronizing
data and control plane states, reordering rules despite barriers and correct
implementation of the speciﬁcation.
Switch X: The data plane conﬁguration of Switch X is slowly falling
behind the control plane acknowledgments — packets start reaching the des-
tination long after the switch conﬁrms the rule installation with a barrier
reply. The divergence increases linearly and, in this experiment reaches 300
ms after only 100 rules. The second observation is that Switch X installs
rules in the order of their control plane arrival. After reporting the problem
of desynchronized data and control plane views to the switch vendor, we re-
ceived a new ﬁrmware version that ﬁxed observed issues to some extent. We
report the improvements in Section 3.2.3.
HP 5406zl: Similarly to Switch X, the data plane conﬁguration of HP
4We need to use such a rule to prevent ﬂooding the control channel with the Packet In
messages caused by data plane probes or ﬂooding the probes to all ports.
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(c) Pica8 P-3290
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(f) NoviSwitch 1132
Figure 3.2: Control plane conﬁrmation times and data plane probe
results for the same ﬂows. Switch data plane installation time may
fall behind the control plane acknowledgments and may be even
reordered.
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5406zl is slowly falling behind the control plane acknowledgments. However,
unlike for Switch X, after about 50 batches, which corresponds to 100 rule
updates (we observed that adding or deleting a rule counts as one update, and
modifying an existing rule as two), the switch stops responding with barrier
replies for 300 ms, which allows the ﬂow tables to catch up. After this
time the process of diverging starts again. In this experiment the divergence
reaches up to 82 ms, but can be as high as 250 ms depending on the number
of rules in the ﬂow table. Moreover, the frequency and the duration of this
period does not depend on the rate at which the controller sends updates,
as long as there is at least one update every 300 ms. The ﬁnal observation
is that HP 5406zl installs rules in the order of their control plane arrival.
Pica8 P-3290: Similarly to HP 5406zl, Pica8 P-3290 stops responding
to barriers in regular intervals. However, unlike HP 5406zl and Switch X,
Pica8 P-3290 is either processing control plane (handling update commands
and responding to barriers), or installing rules in TCAM and never does
both at the same time. Moreover, despite the barriers, the rules are not
installed in hardware in the order of arrival. The delay between data and
control plane reaches up to 400 ms in this experiment. When all remaining
rules get pushed into hardware, the switch starts accepting new commands
in the control plane again. We conﬁrmed with a vendor that because the
synchronization between the software and hardware table is expensive, it is
performed in batches and the order of updates in a batch is not guaranteed.
When the switch pushes updates to hardware, its CPU is busy and it stops
dealing with the control plane.5
Dell 8132F, Switch Y and NoviSwitch 1132: All three switches
make sure that no control plane conﬁrmation is issued before a rule becomes
5The vendor claims that this limitation occurs only in ﬁrmware prior to PicOS 2.2.
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active in hardware. In this experiment we do not see any periods of idleness
as the switch pushes rules to hardware all the time and waits for completion
if necessary. Additionally, because NoviSwitch 1132 is very fast, we increased
the frequency of sending data plane packets in order to guarantee required
measurement precision.
Summary: To reduce the cost of placing rules in a hardware ﬂow ta-
ble, vendors allow for diﬀerent types (e.g., falling behind or reordering) and
amounts (up to 400 ms in this short experiment) of temporary divergence be-
tween the hardware and software ﬂow tables. Therefore, the barrier command
does not guarantee ﬂow installation. Ignoring this problem leads to an
incorrect network state that may drop packets, or even worse,
send them to an undesired destination!
3.2.2 Variability in Control and Data Plane Behavior
The short experiment described in the previous section reveals three ap-
proaches to data and control plane synchronization. In this section we re-
port more detailed unexpected switch behavior types observed when varying
parameters in that experiment. The overall setup stays the same, but we
modify the number of rules in the ﬂow tables, length of the experiments and
range of monitored rules.
Switch X: The short experiment revealed that facing a constant high
update rate Switch X never gives the data plane state a chance to synchronize
with control plane acknowledgments. In this extended experiment we issue
4000 batches of rule deletion and rule installation and monitor every 10th
rule. Figure 3.3 shows the results for various ﬂow table occupancy levels (7%,
25%, 50% and 75%). There are three main observations. First, the switch
indeed does not manage to synchronize the control and data plane states.
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Figure 3.3: Control plane conﬁrmation times and data plane probe
results for the same ﬂows in Switch X (ﬁrmware version V1) de-
pending on ﬂow table occupancy. The rate suddenly slows down
after about 4600 ﬂow installations (including initial rules installed
before the experiment starts).
Second, the update rate increases when the switch is no longer busy with
processing and sending control plane messages. This is visible as a change
of slope of the data plane line in Figures 3.3a and 3.3b. We conﬁrmed
this observation by artiﬁcially occupying the switch with additional Echo
Request or Barrier messages. If the switch control plane stays busy, the
data plane line grows at a constant rate. We believe a low power CPU used in
this switch can easily become a bottleneck and cause the described behavior.
Finally, after installing about 4600 rules since the last full table clear, the
switch becomes signiﬁcantly slower and the gap between what it reports in
the control plane and its actual state quickly diverges. We kept monitoring
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(d) 1300 rules
Figure 3.4: Control plane conﬁrmation times and data plane probe
results for the same ﬂows in HP 5406zl depending on ﬂow table
occupancy. The rate slows down and the pattern changes for over
760 rules in the ﬂow table.
the data plane for 4 minutes after the switch reported all rule modiﬁcations
completed, and still not all rules were in place yet. We run additional tests
and it seems that even performing updates at a lower rate (2 updates every
100 ms) or waiting for a long time (wait for 8 s after every 200 updates) does
not solve the problem. The risk is that the switch performance may degrade
in any deployment where the whole ﬂow table is rarely cleared. We reported
aforementioned issues to the switch vendor and received a conﬁrmation and
an improved ﬁrmware version.
HP 5406zl: The pattern observed in the previous experiment does not
change when parameters vary except for two details depending on the ﬂow
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Figure 3.5: Control plane conﬁrmation times fall behind the data
plane probe results in HP 5406zl when using rules with diﬀerent
priorities. The scale of divergence is unlimited.
table occupancy. We show them in Figure 3.4. First, the 300 ms inactivity
time is constant across all the experiments, but happens three times more
often (every 33 updates) if there are over 760 rules in the ﬂow table (Fig-
ure 3.4c). Second, when the number of rules in the ﬂow table increases, the
maximum delay between control and data plane update increases as well. It
reaches 250 ms when there are 750 rules in the table (Figure 3.4b). For over
760 rules, the switch synchronizes more frequently, so the maximum delay
is smaller again (Figure 3.4c) but goes back to 150 ms for 1300 rules (Fig-
ure 3.4d). We conclude that the real ﬂow table update speed in HP 5406zl
depends on the number of rules in the table, and the switch accounts for a
possible delay by letting the data plane to catch up in regular intervals.
However, we found cases when the switch does not wait long enough,
which may lead to unlimited divergence between the data and control planes.
First, in Figure 3.5 we show that when diﬀerent priorities are used (each rule
has a diﬀerent priority in this experiment), the switch becomes very slow in
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Figure 3.6: Control plane conﬁrmation times fall behind the data
plane probe results in HP 5406zl when ﬁlling the ﬂow table.
applying the changes in hardware without notifying the control plane. This
behavior is especially counter-intuitive since the switch does not support
priorities in hardware. Second, our experiments show that rule deletions are
much faster than installations. Figure 3.6 shows what happens when we
install 500 rules starting from an empty ﬂow table with only a single drop-all
rule. Until there are 300 rules in the table, the 300 ms long periods every
100 updates are suﬃcient to synchronize the views. Later, the data plane
modiﬁcations are unable to keep up with the control plane.
Pica8 P-3290: There are no additional observations related to Pica8
P-3290. The pattern from Figure 3.2c occurs during the whole experiment.
Dell 8132F: As depicted in Figure 3.7, the switch starts updating rules
quickly, but suddenly slows down after 210 new rules installed and main-
tains this slower speed (veriﬁed up to 2000 batches). However, even after
the slowdown, the control plane reliably reﬂects the state of the data plane
conﬁguration. Additionally, we observe periods when the switch does not
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Figure 3.7: Control plane conﬁrmation times and data plane probe
results in Dell 8132F are synchronized, but the update rate sud-
denly slows down after about 210 newly installed rules.
install rules or respond to the controller, but these periods are rare, non-
reproducible and do not seem to be related to the experiments.
Switch Y: Although in the original experiment we observe no periods
of idleness, when the ﬂow table occupancy and the experiment running time
increase, the switch stops processing requests for hundreds of milliseconds
(about 600 ms with 95% occupancy — Figure 3.8) every 2 seconds. Unlike
HP 5406zl, here the idleness frequency depends on time, not the number
of updates. Decreasing the rate at which the controller issues updates does
not aﬀect the idleness duration or frequency. During the period when the
switch does not update its rules, it still responds to control plane messages
(e.g., barriers), but does it slightly slower, as if it was busy. We believe,
this behavior allows the switch to reoptimize its ﬂow tables or perform other
periodic computations. We are in the process of explaining the root cause
with the vendor.
NoviSwitch 1132: Behavior reported in Figure 3.2f repeats in longer
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Figure 3.8: Control plane conﬁrmation times and data plane probe
results in Switch Y with 95% table occupancy are synchronized,
but the switch stops processing new updates for 600 ms after every
2 s.
experiments as well.
Summary: Flow table update rate often depends on the number of in-
stalled rules, but the control plane acknowledgments sometimes do not reﬂect
this variability. A switch ﬂow table state may be minutes behind what it
reported to the control plane.
3.2.3 Firmware Updates Can Improve Switch Perfor-
mance
We reported our ﬁndings to switch vendors and some of them provided us
with new, improved ﬁrmware versions.
Switch X: Most notably, Switch X with ﬁrmware version V2, no longer
allows for data and control plane desynchronization. As we show in Fig-
ure 3.9, both views are synchronized and the rate does not increase when
all control plane messages get processed, since they are no longer processed
before the data plane update ends. On the other hand, the switch still sig-
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Figure 3.9: Control plane conﬁrmation times and data plane probe
results for the same ﬂows in Switch X (ﬁrmware version V2). Data
and control plane views are synchronized, but the rate still slows
down after about 4600 ﬂow installations.
niﬁcantly slows down after about 4600 rule installations without full table
cleaning. We repeat the experiment where we perform single rule installa-
tions and deletions, keeping ﬂow table occupancy stable. Then, we stop an
experiment and resume it after 10 minutes. Figure 3.9b shows the results for
occupancy of 50% (2250 rules). Behavior with the new ﬁrmware is the same
as with the old version (Figure 3.3c). Finally, at the beginning, the updates
are slightly slower than in the previous version and slightly faster when the
switch slows down (compare to Figure 3.3).
NoviSwitch 1132: When we started our measurements of NoviSwitch
1132, the switch was running ﬁrmware version 250.3.2. The update rate was
initially stable at about 60-70 rules/s, but after longer experiments started
dropping to single digits and the switch required reboots. An investigation
revealed that excessive logging was causing the disk space to run out in
our longer and update-intensive experiments. We reported this fact and
the vendor who provided us with a new ﬁrmware version: 250.4.4. A simple
software upgrade allowed the switch to reach stable update rate of about 6000
rules/s — two orders of magnitude higher than before. Another upgrade
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(to version 300.0.1 used to get all measurements reported in this chapter)
increased the update rate by another 10-15% and ﬁxed a bug that was causing
the switch to crash when using long sequences of upgrades of rules with
changing priorities.
Summary: Firmware is often responsible for switch faulty behavior and
an upgrade can ﬁx bugs or signiﬁcantly improve performance without replac-
ing hardware.
3.2.4 Rule Modiﬁcations are not Atomic
Previously, we observed unexpected delays for rule insertions and deletions.
A natural next step is to verify if modifying an existing rule exhibits a similar
unexpected behavior.
A gap during a FlowMod: As before, we prepopulate the ﬂow table
with one low priority match-all rule dropping all packets and R = 300 ﬂow
speciﬁc rules forwarding packets to port α. Then, we modify these 300 rules
to forward to port β. At the same time, we send data plane packets matching
rules 101 − 200 at a rate of about 1000 packets/s per ﬂow. For each ﬂow,
we record a gap between when the last packet arrives at the interface con-
nected to port α and when the ﬁrst packet reaches an interface connected to
β. Expected time diﬀerence is 1 ms because of our measurement precision,
however, we observe gaps lasting up to 7.7, 12.4 and 190 ms on Pica8 P-
3290, Dell 8132F and HP 5406zl respectively (Table 3.2). At HP 5406zl the
longest gaps correspond to the switch inactivity times described earlier (ﬂow
150, 200). A similar experiment with Switch X, Switch Y and NoviSwitch
1132 shows that average and maximum gaps are within our measurement
precision.
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Switch Pica8 P-3290 Dell 8132F HP 5406zl
avg/max gap in
packets [ms]
2.9/7.7 2.2/12.4 10/190
Table 3.2: Time required to observe a change after a rule mod-
iﬁcation. The maximum time when packets do not reach either
destination can be very long.
Drops: To investigate the forwarding gap issue further, we upgrade our
experiment. First, we add a unique identiﬁer to each packet, so that we can
see if packets are being lost or reordered. Moreover, to get higher precision,
we probe only a single rule (number 151 — a rule with an average gap, and
number 150 — a rule with a long gap on HP 5406zl) and increase our probing
rate to 5000 packets/s.
We observe that Pica8 P-3290 does not drop any packets. A continuous
range of packets arrive at port α and the remaining packets at β. On the
other hand, both Dell 8132F and HP 5406zl drop packets at the transition
period for ﬂow 150 (3 and 17 packets respectively). For ﬂow number 150,
HP 5406zl drops an unacceptable number of 782 packets. This suggests that
the update is not atomic — a rule modiﬁcation deactivates the old version
and inserts the new one, with none of them forwarding packets during the
transition.
Unexpected action: To validate the non-atomic modiﬁcation hypoth-
esis we propose two additional experiments. The setup is the same but in
variant I the low priority rule forwards all traﬃc to port γ and in variant II,
there is no low priority rule at all. Incorrectly, but as expected, in variant I
both Dell 8132F and HP 5406zl forward packets in the transition period to
port γ. The number and identiﬁers of packets captured on port γ ﬁt exactly
between the series captured at port α and β. Also unsurprisingly, in variant
II, Dell 8132F ﬂoods the traﬃc during the transition to all ports (default
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behavior for this switch when there is no matching rule). What is unex-
pected is that HP 5406zl in variant II, instead of sending PacketIn messages
to the controller (default when there is no matching rule), ﬂoods packets to
all ports. We reported this ﬁnding to the HP 5406zl vendor and still wait for
a response with a possible explanation of the root cause.
The only imperfection we observed at Pica8 P-3290 in this test is that if
the modiﬁcation changes the output port of the same rule between α and β
frequently, some packets may arrive at the destination out of order. We did
not record any issues with rule modiﬁcations in Switch Y and Switch X.
Finally we observed that NoviSwitch 1132 reorders packets belonging to
diﬀerent ﬂows, but the timescale of this reordering (microseconds) is much
below our probing frequency. That suggests, that the reordering is unrelated
to an incorrect order of rule modiﬁcations. Indeed, we conﬁrmed that pack-
ets in diﬀerent ﬂows get reordered even if there are no rule modiﬁcations.
We also checked, that packets in the same ﬂow do not get reordered. The
switch vendor conﬁrmed that packets belonging to diﬀerent ﬂows may be
processed by diﬀerent cores of the network processor. They also ensured us,
that assuming not too complicated actions, the processing power should be
suﬃcient even for small packets.
Summary: Two out of six tested switches have a transition period during
a rule modiﬁcation when the network conﬁguration is neither in the initial
nor the ﬁnal state. The observed action of forwarding packets to
undesired ports is a security concern. Non-atomic ﬂow modiﬁcation
contradicts the assumption made by controller developers and network update
solutions. Our results suggest that either switches should be redesigned or the
assumptions made by the controllers have to be revisited to guarantee network
correctness.
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Variant
Rhi Rlo
IP src IP dst IP src IP dst
I exact exact exact exact
II exact * * exact
III * exact exact *
IV exact exact exact *
V * exact exact exact
Table 3.3: Combinations of overlapping low and high-priority rules.
3.2.5 Priorities and Overlapping Rules
The OpenFlow speciﬁcation clariﬁes that, if rules overlap (i.e., two rules
match the same packet), packets should always be processed only by the high-
est priority matching rule. Since our default setup with IP src/dst matches
prevents rule overlapping, we run an additional experiment to verify the be-
havior of switches when rules overlap.
The idea of the experiment is to install (in the speciﬁed order) two dif-
ferent priority rules Rhi and Rlo that can match the same packet. Rhi has
a higher priority and forwards traﬃc to port α, Rlo forwards traﬃc to port
β. We test ﬁve variants of matches presented in Table 3.3. Rhi is always
installed before and removed after Rlo to prevent packets from matching
Rlo. Initially, there is one low priority drop-all rule and 150 pairs of Rhi
and Rlo. Then we send 500 update batches, each removing and adding
one rule: (−Rlo,1,+Rhi,151), (−Rhi,1,+Rlo,151), (−Rlo,2,+Rhi,152), . . . We send
data plane traﬃc for 100 ﬂows. If a switch works correctly, no packets should
reach port β.
Table 3.4 summarizes the results. First, as we already noted, Dell 8132F,
Switch Y, Switch X and NoviSwitch 1132 do not reorder updates between
batches and therefore, there are no packets captured at port β in any variant.
The only way to allow some packets on port β in Dell 8132F is to increase
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Switch Observed/inferred behavior
Switch X OK
HP 5406zl Ignores priority, last updated rule permanently
wins
Pica8 P-3290 OK for the same match. For overlapping match
may temporarily reorder (depending on wildcard
combinations)
Dell 8132F OK (Reorders within a batch)
Switch Y OK
NoviSwitch 1132 OK
Table 3.4: Priority handling of overlapping rules. Both HP 5406zl
and Pica8 P-3290 violate the OpenFlow speciﬁcation.
the batch size — the switch freely reorders updates inside a batch and seems
to push them to hardware in order of priorities. On the other hand, Pica8
P-3290 applies updates in the correct order only if the high priority rule has
the IP source speciﬁed. Otherwise, for a short period of time — 210 ms
on average, 410ms maximum in the described experiment — packets follow
the low priority rule. Our hypothesis is that the data structure used to
store the software ﬂow table sorts the rules such that when they are pushed
to hardware the ones with IP source speciﬁed are pushed ﬁrst. Finally, in
HP 5406zl only the ﬁrst few packets of each ﬂow (for 80 ms on average,
103 ms max in this experiment) are forwarded to α and all the rest to β.
We believe that the switch ignores the priorities in hardware (as hinted in
documentation of the older ﬁrmware version) and treats rules installed later
as more important. We conﬁrm this hypothesis with additional experiments
not reported here. Further, because the priorities are trimmed in hardware,
when installing two rules with exactly the same match but diﬀerent priorities
and actions the switch returns an error.
Summary: Results (Table 3.4) suggest that switches may permanently
or temporarily forward according to incorrect, low priority rules.
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Experiment In-ﬂightbatches
Batch
size
(del+add)
Initial
rules R
In-ﬂight batches 1-20 1+1 300
Flow table occupancy 2 1+1 50 to maxfor switch
Priorities as in Flow table occupancy + a singlelow priority rule in the ﬂow table
Access patterns 2 1+1
50 to max
for switch
+priorities
Working set
as in Flow table occupancy, vary the
number of rules that are not updated
during the experiment
Batch size 2 1+1 to20+20 300
Table 3.5: Dimensions of experimental parameters we report in this
section. Note, that we also run experiments for other combinations
of parameters to verify the conclusions.
3.3 Results: Flow Table Update Speed
The goal of the next set of experiments is to pinpoint the most important
aspects that aﬀect rule update speed. We ﬁrst pick various performance-
related parameters: the number of in-ﬂight commands, current ﬂow table
occupancy, size of request batches, used priorities, rule access patterns. Then
we sample the whole space of these parameters and try to identify the ones
that cause some variation. From the previous section we know that although
the control plane information is imprecise, in a long run the error becomes
negligible, because all switches except for Switch X synchronize the data
and control plane views regularly. Therefore, we rely on barriers to measure
update rates in long running experiments used in this section. Based on the
results, we select a few experimental conﬁgurations which highlight most of
our ﬁndings and present them in Table 3.5.
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Figure 3.10: Switch performance increases with the number of in-
ﬂight requests. However, the improvements beyond the case where
the controller waits for conﬁrmation of the previous request before
sending the next one (k = 1) are negligible.
3.3.1 Two In-ﬂight Batches Keep the Switch Busy
Setting the number of commands a controller should send to the switch before
receiving any acknowledgments is an important decision when building a
controller [67]. Underutilizing or overloading the switch with commands is
undesired. Here, we quantify the tradeoﬀ between rule update rate and the
servicing delay (time between sending a command and the switch applying
it) to ﬁnd a performance sweet spot.
We use the default setup with R = 300 and B = 2000 batches of rule
updates. The controller sends batch i+k only when it receives a barrier reply
for batch number i. Note that barrier replies come always in order, i.e., we
receive conﬁguration of batch i only after all batches < i are conﬁrmed. We
vary k and report the average rule update rate, which we compute as 2∗B/T
where T is the time between sending the ﬁrst batch and receiving a barrier
reply for the last and 2 comes from the fact that each batch contains one add
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Figure 3.11: HP 5406zl barrier reply arrival times. HP 5406zl
postpones sending barrier replies until there are no more pending
requests or there are 29 pending responses.
and one delete message.
Figure 3.10 shows the average update rate. The rule update rate with
one outstanding batch is low as the switch is idle for at least a network RTT.
However, even two in-ﬂight batches are usually suﬃcient to saturate tested
switches given our network latencies. Thus, we use 2 in-ﬂight batches in all
following experiments. Since the update rate for NoviSwitch 1132 is often
an order of magnitude higher than other switches, we use plots with a split
y axis.
Looking deeper into the results, we notice that with a changing number
of in-ﬂight batches HP 5406zl responds in an unexpected way. In Figure 3.11
we plot the barrier reply arrival times normalized to the time when the ﬁrst
batch was sent for R = 300, B = 50 and a number of in-ﬂight batches varying
between 1 and 50. We show the results for only 4 values to improve readabil-
ity. If there are requests in the queue, the switch batches the responses and
sends them together in bigger groups. If the constant stream of requests is
shorter than 30, the switch waits to process all, otherwise, the ﬁrst response
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comes after 29 requests. This observation makes it diﬃcult to build a con-
troller that keeps the switch command queue short but full. The controller
has to either let the queue get empty, or maintain the length longer than 30
batches. But based on the previous observation, even letting the queue to
get empty has minimal impact on the throughput.
Summary: We demonstrate that with LAN latencies two or three in-
ﬂight batches suﬃce to achieve full switch performance. Since, many in-ﬂight
requests increase the service time, controllers should send only a handful of
requests at a time.
3.3.2 Current Flow Table Occupancy Matters
The number of rules stored in a ﬂow table is a very important parameter
for a switch. Bigger tables allow for a ﬁne grained traﬃc control. However,
there is a well known tradeoﬀ — TCAM space is expensive, so tables that
allow complex matches usually have limited size.
We discover another, hidden cost of full ﬂow tables. Namely, we analyze
how the rule update rate is aﬀected by the current number of rules installed
in the ﬂow table. We use the default setup ﬁxing B = 2000 and changing
the value of R.
In Figure 3.12 we report the average rule update rate when varying switch
ﬂow table occupancy. There are three distinct patterns visible. Pica8 P-
3290, Dell 8132F and Switch Y express similar behavior. The rule update
rate is high when the ﬂow table contains a small number of entries but
quickly deteriorates as the number of entries increases. As we conﬁrmed
with one of the vendors and deduced based on statistics of another switch,
there are two reasons why the performance drops when the number of rules
in the table increases. First, even if a switch ultimately installs all rules in
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Figure 3.12: For most switches the performance decreases when
the number of rules in the ﬂow table is higher.
hardware, it keeps a software ﬂow table as well. The ﬂows are ﬁrst updated
in the software data structure which takes more time when the structure
is bigger. Second, the rules need to be pushed into hardware (the switch
ASIC), which may require rearranging the existing entries. Unlike other
ASIC-based switches, HP 5406zl maintains a lower, but stable rate following
a step function with a breaking point around 760 rules in the ﬂow table.
This stability is caused by periods of inactivity explained in Section 3.2. An
update rate for NoviSwitch 1132 is an order of magnitude higher than for
other switches. Additionally, the fast update rate (about 7000 updates/s)
and its stability that is independent of the ﬂow table occupancy for this
device contrasts with all other switches.
Since Switch X update rate changes during an experiment and in older
ﬁrmware version it does not oﬀer a reliable way to measure its performance
based on the control plane only, we manually computed update rates from
the data plane experiments. As previously explained, there are three phases
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Occupancy phase I phase II phase III
7% (300 rules) 415 rules/s 860 rules/s —
25% (1125 rules) 374 rules/s 790 rules/s 34 rules/s
50% (2250 rules) 340 rules/s — 28 rules/s
75% (3375 rules) 320 rules/s — 20 rules/s
95% (4275 rules) 302 rules/s — 8 rules/s
Table 3.6: Flow table update rate in Switch X depending on switch
state and ﬂow table occupancy. The rate gradually decreases with
increasing number of rules in the ﬂow table. After installing a total
number of about 4600 rules, the switch update rate drastically
decreases.
in this switch operation: slow rate when the switch is busy with control
plane, fast rate when the switch does not deal with the control plane, and
a very slow phase after the switch has installed about 4600 rules. Table 3.6
contains update rates in these three phases depending on the ﬂow table occu-
pancy (phase II is missing when the transition to phase III happens before all
control plane messages are processed, phase III is missing for 7% occupancy,
because the experiment is too short to reveal it). The results show that the
switch performs similarly to other tested devices (Figure 3.12) until it installs
4600 rules during the experiment. After that point the performance drops
signiﬁcantly (phase III). It is also visible that the switch can modify rules
two times quicker when it does not need to process control plane messages
(phase II).
Summary: The performance of most tested switches drops with a number
of installed rules, but the absolute values and the slope of this drop vary.
Therefore, controller developers should not only take into account the total
ﬂow table size, but also what is the performance cost of ﬁlling the table with
additional rules.
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Figure 3.13: Priorities cripple performance — Experiment from
Figure 3.12 repeated with a single additional low-priority rule in-
stalled reveals a massive fall in performance for two of the tested
switches.
3.3.3 Priorities Decrease the Update Rate
OpenFlow allows to assign a priority to each rule, but all our previous experi-
ments considered only rules with equal, default priorities. A packet is always
processed according to the highest priority rule that matches its header. Fur-
thermore, in OpenFlow 1.0, the default behavior for a packet not matching
any rule is to encapsulate it in a Packet In message and send to the con-
troller. To avoid overloading the controller, it is often desirable to install
a lowest priority all-matching rule that drops packets. We conduct an ex-
periment that mimics such a situation. The experiment setup is exactly the
same as the one described in Section 3.3.2 with one additional lowest priority
drop-all rule installed before all ﬂow-speciﬁc rules.
Figure 3.13 shows that for a low ﬂow table occupancy, all switches per-
form the same as without the low priority rule. However, Pica8 P-3290 and
Dell 8132F suﬀer from a signiﬁcant drop in performance at about 130 and
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255 installed rules respectively. After this massive drop, the performance
gradually decreases until it reaches 12 updates/s for 2000 rules in the ﬂow
table for Pica8 P-3290 and 30 updates/s for 750 rules in the ﬂow table for
Dell 8132F where both switches have their tables almost full. Interestingly,
HP 5406zl’s update rate does not decrease, possibly because it ignores the
priorities. Switch Y and NoviSwitch 1132 update their ﬂow tables at the
same rate with and without the low priority rule. Again, for plot readability
we do not show the rate for NoviSwitch 1132, which is an order of magnitude
higher than other switches. We conﬁrm that the results are not aﬀected by
the fully wildcarded match or the drop action in the low priority rule by
replacing it with a speciﬁc IP src/dst match and a forwarding action.
Finally, we rerun the experiments from Section 3.3.1 with a low priority
rule. The rates for Pica8 P-3290 and Dell 8132F are lower, but the charac-
teristics and the conclusions hold.
More priorities: Next, we check the eﬀect of using diﬀerent priorities
for each rule. We modify the default set-up such that each rule has a diﬀerent
priority assigned and install them in an increasing (rule i has a priority D+i,
whereD is the default priority value) or decreasing (rule i has a priorityD−i)
order.
Switches react diﬀerently. As it is visible in Figure 3.14, both Pica8 P-
3290’s and Dell 8132F’s performance follows a similar curve as in the previous
experiment. There is no breaking point though. In both cases the perfor-
mance is higher with only a single diﬀerent priority rule until the breaking
point, after which they become equal. Further, Pica8 P-3290 updates rules
quicker in the increasing priority scenario.6
Figure 3.14 shows that also NoviSwitch 1132 becomes signiﬁcantly slower
6This is consistent with the observation made in [59], but the diﬀerence is smaller as for
each addition we also delete the lowest priority rule.
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Figure 3.14: Switch rule update performance for diﬀerent rule pri-
ority patterns.
when there are additional priorities used. Based on the ﬁgure, the update rate
depends on the number of rules in the ﬂow table. Even with just 50 installed
rules, the rate drops from original 7000 updates/s to about 420. When the
table occupancy increases the rate is as low as 5 updates/s. Update pattern
does not matter — in the decreasing priority scenario the rate is minimally
higher (up to 3%). In both cases, the update rate is inversely proportional
to the occupancy. A deeper analysis shows, that the rate depends more on
the number of priorities used than a total number of rules (Table 3.7). For
example, the rate with 1000 rules in the table when rule i has a priority
D − 	 i
10

 is almost equal to the rate with 100 initial rules in Figure 3.14.
Further, it also seems that adding a rule with a new priority to the table
takes a lot of time. When we run the experiment with rules using the same
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Priorities 1000 rules 2000 rules
D − 	 i
10

 216 rules/s 110 rules/s
D − 	 i
20

 374 rules/s 215 rules/s
D − (i%10) 5222 rules/s 5588 rules/s
D − (i%20) 6468 rules/s 6142 rules/s
Table 3.7: Flow table update rate in NoviSwitch 1132 depending
on priority patterns and ﬂow table occupancy. The rate depends
on the number of priorities in use and number of newly added
priorities.
priorities as rules installed in the table before the experiment started, the rate
is much higher. The vendor conﬁrms that handling many priorities requires
the switch to move some rules in TCAM, which makes updates slower. They
use optimizations to reduce an impact of this movements when the number
of priorities is small.
HP 5406zl control plane measurement is not aﬀected by the priorities,
but as our data plane study shows there is a serious divergence between
the control plane reports and the reality for this switch in this experiment
(see Section 3.4). Finally, using diﬀerent priorities does not aﬀect Switch Y
performance.
Working set size: Finally, we check what happens if only a small subset
of rules in the table (later referred as “working set”) is frequently updated.
We modify the default experiment setup such that batch i deletes the rule
matching ﬂow number i − W and installs a rule matching ﬂow i. We vary
the value of W . In other words, assuming there are R rules initially in the
ﬂow table, the ﬁrst R −W rules never change and we update only the last
W rules.
The results show that HP 5406zl performance is unaﬀected and remains
the same as presented in Figures 3.12 and 3.13 both below and above the
threshold of 760 rules in the ﬂow table. Further, for both Pica8 P-3290 and
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Figure 3.15: Size of the rule working set size aﬀects the perfor-
mance. For both Pica8 P-3290 and Dell 8132F when the low prior-
ity rule is installed, the performance depends mostly on the count
of the rules being constantly changed and not on the total number
of rules installed (1000 for Pica8 P-3290 and 500 for Dell 8132F
in the plots). The same can be said about NoviSwitch 1132 with
various rule priorities (2000 installed rules in the plot).
Dell 8132F a small working set for updates makes no diﬀerence if there is no
low priority rule. For a given R (1000 for Pica8 P-3290 and 500 for Dell 8132F
in Figure 3.15), the performance is constant regardless of W . However, when
the low priority rule is installed, the update rate characteristic changes as
shown in Figure 3.15. For both switches, as long as the update working set is
smaller than their breaking point revealed in Section 3.3.2, the performance
stays as if there was no drop rule. After the breaking point, it degrades and
is only marginally worse compared to the results in Section 3.3.2 for table
occupancy W .
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A working set size aﬀects NoviSwitch 1132 as well. In this case, we analyze
its performance when using multiple priorities (Figure 3.15) with R = 2000.
The rate depends on the working set size and is almost the same as the rate
with the same total number or rules in the ﬂow table.
Summary: The switch performance is diﬃcult to predict — a single rule
can degrade the update rate of a switch by an order of magnitude. Controller
developers should be aware of such behavior and avoid potential sources of
ineﬃciencies.
3.3.4 Barrier Synchronization Penalty Varies
A barrier request-reply pair of messages is very useful, as according to the
speciﬁcation, it is the only way for the controller to (i) force an order of
operations on the switch, and (ii) make sure that the switch control plane
processed all previous commands. The latter becomes important if the con-
troller needs to know about any errors before continuing on with the switch
reconﬁguration. Because barriers might be needed frequently, in this experi-
ment we measure the overhead given a frequency with which we use barriers.
We repeat our general experiment setup with R = 300 preinstalled rules,
this time varying the number of rule deletions and insertions in a single batch.
To keep ﬂow table size from diverging during the experiment, we use an equal
number of deletions and insertions.
As visible in Figure 3.16, for both Pica8 P-3290 and HP 5406zl the rate
slowly increases with growing batch size, but the diﬀerence is marginal: up
to 14% for Pica8 P-3290 and up to 8% for HP 5406zl for a batch size growing
20 times. On the other hand, Dell 8132F speeds up 3 times in the same
range if no priorities are involved. The same observation can be made for
Switch Y.
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Figure 3.16: Cost of frequent barriers is modest except for the case
of Dell 8132F with no priorities (i.e., with high baseline speed) and
Switch Y where the cost is signiﬁcant.
While further investigating these results, we veriﬁed that the barrier over-
head for each particular switch recalculated in terms of milliseconds is con-
stant across a wide range of parameters — a barrier takes roughly 0.1-0.3ms
for Pica8 P-3290, 3.1-3.4ms for Dell 8132F, 1ms for Switch Y, 0.6-0.7ms for
HP 5406zl and 0.04ms for NoviSwitch 1132. This explains the high overhead
of Switch Y and Dell 8132F for fast rule installations in Figure 3.16 — barri-
ers just take time comparable to rule installations. Taking into account that
Switch Y and Dell 8132F are the only tested ASIC-based switches that pro-
vide correct barriers, our conclusion is that a working barrier implementation
is costly.
Summary: Overall, we see that barrier cost varies across devices. The
controller, therefore, should be aware of the potential impact and balance be-
tween the switch performance and potential notiﬁcation staleness. Moreover,
there is a tradeoﬀ between correct barrier implementation and performance.
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3.4 Results: Other Surprises and Trivia
In the process of running the experiments and digging deep to ﬁnd and un-
derstand the root causes of various unexpected behaviors we made additional
observations. They are not worth a section on their own because they have
lower practical importance or we cannot fully explain and conﬁrm them.
However, we brieﬂy report them as someone may ﬁnd this information useful
or inspiring to further investigate the issue.
Rule insertion may act as a modiﬁcation. In one of the experiments
we show that two out of six switches are unable to perform an atomic rule
modiﬁcation. However, when receiving a rule that has the same match and
the same priority as an already installed one, but a diﬀerent set of actions, all
the tested switches modify the existing rule. Moreover, this operation does
not lead to any packet drops on HP 5406zl, which is better than the actual
rule modiﬁcation. The behavior on Dell 8132F remains unchanged.
Data plane traﬃc can increase the update rate of Pica8 P-3290.
We noticed that in some cases, sending data plane traﬃc that matches cur-
rently installed rules at Pica8 P-3290 can speed up the general update rate
and even future updates. We are still investigating this issue and can not
provide an explanation of this phenomenon nor conﬁrm it with full certainty,
but we report it anyway as something completely counter intuitive.
Dell 8132F performs well with a full ﬂow table. In Section 3.3.3 we
report that the performance of Dell 8132F with a low priority rule installed
decreases with the growing table occupancy and drops down to about 30
updates per second when the ﬂow table contains 751 rules. We observed
that this trend continues, until the table is full or there is one slot left.
Surprisingly, the switch performs updates that remove a rule and install a
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Figure 3.17: An update rate in Dell 8132F suddenly increases for
4 speciﬁc ﬂow table occupancy values.
new one with a full table at a rate comparable to that observed without the
low priority rule. We show the update rate measured for all possible ﬂow
table occupancies in an experiment with 2000 update batches in Figure 3.17.
There is a sudden performance drop at 510 and 511 rules. Measurements in
both these points have a very high standard deviation, but the results for a
full table are stable.
3.5 Summary
The methodology presented in this chapter allows us to advance the general
understanding of OpenFlow switch performance. Speciﬁcally, by focusing
on analyzing control plane performance and Forwarding Information Base
(FIB) update rate in hardware OpenFlow switches we detected that: (i)
control plane performance is widely variable, and it depends on ﬂow table
occupancy, rule priorities, size of batches, and even rule update patterns — in
particular, priorities can cripple performance; (ii) switches might periodically
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or randomly stop processing control plane commands for up to 500 ms; (iii)
the data plane state might not reﬂect the control plane — it might fall behind
by several minutes and it might also manifest rule installations in a diﬀerent
order; (iv) seemingly atomic data plane updates might not be atomic at all.
The impact of our ﬁndings is multifold and profound. The non-atomicity
of seemingly atomic data plane updates means that there are periods when
the network conﬁguration is incorrect despite looking correct from the con-
trol plane perspective. The existing tools that check if the control plane is
correctly conﬁgured [50–52] are unable to detect these problems. Moreover,
the data plane can fall behind and unfortunately barriers cannot be trusted.
This means that approaches for performing consistent updates need to devise
a diﬀerent way of deﬁning when a rule is installed; otherwise they are not
providing any ﬁrm guarantees. Finally, because the performance of a single
switch depends on previously applied updates, developers need to account
for this variable performance when designing their controllers.
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Chapter 4
RUM: Software-based Solution to
Performance Diﬀerences
This chapter presents a software-based technique that addresses the security-
critical issue revealed in Chapter 3: inconsistent Barrier implementations.
The Barrier commands are commonly used during network updates,
when a controller modiﬁes forwarding behavior of one or multiple switches.
The network update process is complicated and if not conducted carefully,
may lead to transient problems such as black holes, forwarding loops, link
overload, and packets reaching undesired destinations. There are many ap-
proaches that guarantee various correctness properties [49, 60, 62, 70]. These
all split an update into many smaller stages, and rely on knowing when a
particular rule modiﬁcation was applied at the switch(es) before proceed-
ing to the next stage and issuing further modiﬁcations. This necessitates
positive acknowledgments conﬁrming rule modiﬁcations. Unfortunately, in
OpenFlow there is no mechanism with a sole purpose of acknowledging rule
modiﬁcations. Instead, there exists a Barrier command with a more general
functionality. However, as we show in the previous chapter, not all switches
satisfy the speciﬁcation in this command that is crucial for correctness.
Although ultimately vendors should ﬁx all errors in the switches, this
process takes time. Instead we take advantage of one of the main selling
points of SDN, and add new functionality in software quickly and for low
cost. The solution presented in this chapter introduces a transparent layer
below an SDN controller that provides reliable acknowledgments for rule
modiﬁcations. This method relies on various methods, including data plane
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Figure 4.1: Consistent network update using a hardware switch.
Despite theoretical guarantees, for most ﬂows switch S1 gets up-
dated before S2 and the network drops packets for up to 290 ms.
Using our system eliminates this problem.
probing schemes, that achieve the aforementioned goal depending on switch
capabilities. When using these techniques, the controller can never receive an
acknowledgment before a corresponding rule is installed in the data plane.
Moreover, at the cost of a higher overhead, such a layer can also provide
barrier-like guarantees to the controller working with switches that do not
implement barriers correctly.
4.1 Motivating Example
To demonstrate the magnitude of the problem, we prepare a small end-to-end
test: We set up a network in a triangle topology with the hardware switch
S2 and two software switches S1 and S3 (Figure 4.1a). We preinstall paths
for 300 IP ﬂows between hosts H1 and H2 going through switches S1 and
S3. Then, we perform an update that modiﬁes the paths to S1-S2-S3 in a
consistent manner, such that a given packet can follow the old rules only or
the new rules only [70].
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Figure 4.2: If switch B does not report data plane updates cor-
rectly, the theoretically safe update that adds rules for trusted and
untrusted traﬃc from the same host turns into a transient security
hole.
Despite using consistent updates, some ﬂows drop packets for an extended
period of time (Figure 4.1b). A detailed analysis shows that the switch sends
the barrier reply up to 290 ms before the rule modiﬁcation becomes visible
to data plane traﬃc. Based on Chapter 3 we know that other switch models
not only reply to barriers too early, but also reorder rule updates across
barriers. The consequences of this observation have great impact — even
though provably correct in theory, none of the consistent network update
techniques work in practice with buggy switches, and all systems that build
upon these techniques are unsafe as well. In particular, buggy behavior may
lead to security violations, broken bandwidth guarantees, or black holes —
an example of the ﬁrst is depicted in Figure 4.2. If the issues that we bring
up here are not addressed (e.g., by adopting one of our schemes) the SDN
deployments that are increasingly taking place in enterprises are in jeopardy.
While an incorrect barrier implementation may be just a temporary prob-
lem and not a fundamental limitation (some of the tested switches do imple-
ment barriers correctly), we see three main reasons why it should be imme-
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diately addressed. First, there are many solutions that rely on barriers and
it cannot be expected that all switches in a network will correctly function.
Second, even after ﬁve major revisions the OpenFlow speciﬁcation is unclear
— it does not explicitly state that the commands must be applied in the data
plane, instead it may be understood that the barrier enforces control plane-
ordering only. This in turn means that, unless there is a high pressure from
customers, vendors will have no incentive to provide data plane-level con-
ﬁrmations, and therefore the problem might not disappear in future switch
generations. Finally, we argue that controllers need acknowledgments of each
rule installation, rather than only high level barriers [68]. Therefore, we go
one step further than just ﬁxing barriers, and the solutions we propose pro-
vide such ﬁne grained rule update acknowledgments.
4.2 System Overview
We have two main requirements in mind when designing our system called
RUM (Rule Update Monitoring). First, it needs to work with existing
switches and take into account their capabilities and limitations. Second, the
system should provide reliable barrier commands in a backward-compatible
way without requiring any modiﬁcations to the existing controllers and switches.
However, it should allow the RUM-aware controllers to beneﬁt from ﬁne
grained acknowledgments.
Acknowledging rule modiﬁcations. The ﬁrst goal of the system is to pro-
vide reliable rule modiﬁcation acknowledgments to the OpenFlow-speaking
controllers. We design RUM as a transparent layer between the switches and
the controller that intercepts and modiﬁes the communication between them
similarly to FlowVisor [77] or VeriFlow [52]. In contrast with these systems,
RUM plays a more active role in the interception, as it can buﬀer, rate-limit,
90
remove or add messages. To allow easy deployment and transparency for con-
trollers that are not designed to work with the ﬁne grained acknowledgments,
RUM adapts existing OpenFlow messages to convey successful modiﬁcations
(such notiﬁcations are not available in OpenFlow). Depending on the re-
quired precision and available switch properties, the techniques (Section 4.3)
rely only on the control plane communication with the tested switch, or may
install additional rules and involve the neighboring switches.
Providing reliable barriers. To provide reliable barriers, RUM intercepts
all Barrier requests and replies. After capturing a Barrier request, RUM
holds oﬀ sending the corresponding Barrier reply and following messages
from the switch until it can ensure that the switch completed all pending
operations. An ability to correctly acknowledge commands issued to the
switch is therefore the key to reliable barriers. Additionally, when working
with switches that reorder modiﬁcations across barriers, RUM buﬀers all
commands that the controller sends after the last unconﬁrmed barrier. It
releases them to the switch after acknowledging the barrier. The barrier layer
uses standard OpenFlow Barrier commands and is therefore transparent to
any controller.
4.3 Data Plane Acknowledgments
RUM aims to acknowledge rule modiﬁcations as soon as the new rule is
active in a switch data plane, but not sooner. Because diﬀerent switches have
diﬀerent limitations and capabilities, we discuss several possible solutions to
the problem at hand.
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4.3.1 Control Plane Only Techniques
The ﬁrst class of techniques uses control plane information only and requires
modeling the switch behavior. They make minimal assumptions about the
switches but instead do not oﬀer strong guarantees.
Using OpenFlow barrier commands. Relying on Barrier messages
is a natural way to receive acknowledgments in OpenFlow (the only way
deﬁned by the speciﬁcation). Therefore, we present it as a baseline. A
switch must send a Barrier reply message only after it ﬁnishes processing
all previous commands. However, our measurements in Chapter 3 show that
some switches respond to a barrier immediately, before the modiﬁcations were
applied to the data plane, and as a result the data plane is often between
100 and 300 ms behind what may be assumed based on Barrier replies.
This conﬁrms previous measurements [72] indicating that barriers cannot be
trusted and should not be used as rule update conﬁrmations.
While one can imagine using other OpenFlow commands instead of barri-
ers (e.g., using statistics requests), we believe that such an approach does not
solve the underlying problem — the reply from the switch is still based on
its control plane view and/or it does not have enough temporal granularity
(e.g., ﬂow statistics might be updated only once per second). Therefore, in
the rest of this section we introduce techniques that still rely on the barriers,
but take into account the data plane delay.
Delaying barrier acknowledgments. The ﬁrst technique relies on exper-
iments prior to deployment. If the maximum time between the barrier reply
and the rule modiﬁcation being applied is bounded and can be measured,
RUM waits for this time after receiving a reply before conﬁrming earlier
modiﬁcations.
The main drawback of this method is that it requires precise delay mea-
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surements or overestimation. We observe that in practice the delay depends
on many, often diﬃcult to predict factors and therefore providing strong
guarantees is diﬃcult (Chapter 3). For example, if the data plane is typi-
cally delayed by up to 100 ms, but there are cases of a 300-ms delay, one
needs to assume the worst case scenario and always wait for 300 ms. Even
then, in hard to predict corner cases, the delay may reach several seconds,
which is impractical to use as the upper bound. Therefore, waiting for a
timeout after each barrier has a negative impact on update performance and
rule modiﬁcation rate.
Adaptive delay. Adaptive timeout improves the performance of the pre-
vious technique, but requires even more detailed measurements to develop a
precise switch model. Based on such models and knowing the rate at which a
controller issues modiﬁcation commands, RUM estimates when a particular
rule modiﬁcation will take place in the switch. Thus, the timeout is ad-
justed accordingly. However, this method requires building detailed switch
performance models, which is diﬃcult.
4.3.2 Data Plane Probes
The basic idea of data plane probes is to inject special packets into the
network and use them, as well as special probing rules, to monitor which rules
are active in the data plane. There are two aspects of OpenFlow Barrier
commands: (i) a switch should respond with a Barrier reply after processing
all previous commands, and (ii) a switch should never reorder commands
separated by barriers. In practice some switches violate either the ﬁrst of
these properties (because they process commands in the control plane, but
push the rules to the data plane later), or both. The two techniques presented
in this section are designed to work correctly with such two classes of switches.
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4.3.2.1 Sequential Probing
If a switch violates only the ﬁrst barrier property (responds to barriers too
early) two modiﬁcations separated by a barrier are never reordered in the data
plane. Therefore, a strawman solution follows each real rule modiﬁcation
with a barrier and an additional rule installation for probing. By the time
the probing rule is determined to be active (i.e., it forwards a probing packet),
the original rule must be in place as well.
Implementation-wise, the probing rule matches only the specially selected
probe packets and has a high priority so that no other rule can override
it. The probing rule sends the matching packets to the controller. RUM
then repetitively injects probe packets (using a Packet Out message) into
the switch forwarding pipeline and when the probe arrives back to RUM, it
means that the probe rule is installed and therefore the corresponding real
rule is active as well. Finally, after probing rule is conﬁrmed, it is no longer
needed and can be removed.
There are, however, technical details of the strawman solution that make
it impractical and require improvements. First, from the correctness perspec-
tive, it assumes that the Packet Out processing and probe rule matching are
performed in hardware. Unfortunately, this might not be the case – rules
sending packets to the controller are often kept in software and may start
forwarding traﬃc before the previous hardware rules are pushed into the data
plane. As such, we modify our solution to use hardware-only probing rules
– we use two additional switches1 as depicted in Figure 4.3.
Second, inserting one probe rule after each normal rule is prohibitively
expensive. Instead, we notice that a single probe rule installed after a batch
1In principle, switches A and C can be the same switch. We keep them separated for the
presentation purposes.
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Figure 4.3: Probing the data plane at switch B. The controller
(RUM) sends a probe packet from switch A to switch B. If B
installed the probing rule, it forwards the packet to switch C which
sends it back to the controller.
of several rule modiﬁcations acknowledges the whole batch at the same time.
This way the probing overhead gets amortized over more rules at the ex-
pense of a longer acknowledgment delay. Moreover, the probe rules can be
optimized even more – instead of installing a new probe rule for each batch
and then deleting it, we use a single probing rule which rewrites a particular
ﬁeld in the packet header (e.g., ToS or VLAN) with a version number of this
probing rule. Then, we just update the rule to write the new version number
to the probe packet header. RUM recognizes the last version of probe rule
based on the probing packet headers it receives back.
Multi-switch deployment. The approach described so far requires setting
up diﬀerent probe rules matching diﬀerent packets for each probed switch,
because otherwise forwarding the probe packet on the next switch will in-
terfere with probe collection on that switch. We overcome this problem by
choosing two header ﬁelds H1 and H2 to be used by probing. These can be
any rewritable ﬁelds in a packet header. Additionally, we reserve two special
values of H1; we call these values preprobe and postprobe. In our solution,
all switches install a high priority probe-catch rule that sends all packets
with H1 == postprobe to the controller. We also install one probing rule per
each switch. It matches packets with H1 == preprobe and rewriting them
to post-probes while also storing the per-switch unique probe rule version in
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Figure 4.4: Network-wide probing solution. There are two rules
preinstalled at each switch and only the version of the probing rule
is updated over time.
H2 (H1 ← postprobe, H2 ← ver). To do the probing, RUM sends a probe
packet with H1 = preprobe inside a Packet Out message through switch A
towards switch B as depicted in Figure 4.4.
This technique comes with two sources of overhead. First, a switch needs
to install the probe rules which reduces its usable rule update rate. Fur-
ther, the probe rules are probed by data plane packets, which aﬀects the
neighboring switches’ control planes though the Packet Out and Packet In
messages. Thus, there is a trade-oﬀ between notiﬁcation delay and the usable
update rate.
4.3.2.2 General Probing
The ﬁnal strategy addresses the problem of switches that reorder rule mod-
iﬁcations despite the use of barriers. In such a case, conﬁrming that the
last update took place is insuﬃcient to acknowledge all previous updates.
Speciﬁcally, it means that we cannot rely on probe rules described previ-
ously. Instead RUM needs to conﬁrm each modiﬁcation separately, where a
modiﬁed rule may match an arbitrary set of header ﬁelds.
In this strategy, we need to reserve a header ﬁeld H that is not used in
the network, meaning that all normal rules have it wildcarded and no packet
has it set to a value used by RUM (e.g., VLAN, MPLS or ToS depending
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Figure 4.5: Probing for a rule matching IP packets with source Rs
and destination Rd. A probe packet matches the tested rule at B
and a send-to-controller rule at C.
on the deployment). At the beginning, each switch i gets assigned a unique
value Si of ﬁeld H. Each switch i then installs a high priority probe-catching
rule that sends all packets that match on H == Si to the controller. Figure
4.5 shows a scenario where RUM conﬁrms the installation of the rule that
matches packets with an IP source Rs and IP destination Rd and forwards
them to switch C. Assuming the action of the probed rule is to send the
traﬃc to switch C, we use switch C with its probe-catch rule matching on
H == Sc to receive the probes. To create the probe packet, RUM computes
an intersection of the probed rule on switch B and probe-catch rule on switch
C. In our example, the probe packet has IPsrc = Rs, IPdst = Rd, H = Sc
and arbitrary remaining header ﬁelds. This probe gets injected through
any neighbor of switch B (e.g., switch A). As soon as the tested rule gets
installed, the controller observes the probe packet coming from switch C
inside a Packet In message. The same method can detect rule deletions
(probes stop arriving at the controller) or rule modiﬁcations (probes reach
the controller from a diﬀerent neighbor of B or have header ﬁelds modiﬁed
to new values in case of header rewriting rules).
Overlapping rules. The previous, simpliﬁed description does not take into
account the fact that there is more than one rule installed at a given switch.
When creating a probe packet for a particular rule, RUM needs to take into
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account other rules such that the probe does not get forwarded by any other,
already installed rule. In particular, probe generation needs to address two
issues.
First, the generated probe packet must not match any higher-priority rule
which overlaps with the probed rule. While ﬁnding a probing packet that
hits exactly the tested rule is NP in a general case, others [50,87] show that in
practice the problem can be solved quickly for real forwarding tables. Second,
the generated probe packet must have a diﬀerent forwarding action (i.e.,
either a diﬀerent output port or a diﬀerent rewrite action) than the lower-
priority rule matching the probe when the probed rule is not installed yet
(otherwise we cannot distinguish if the packet was processed by the probed
rule or the lower-priority rule). Note that as a special case, we can probe
for rules dropping packets if there exists an overlapping lower-priority which
does not drop the packets (a common case of ACLs and forwarding rules
combination). If no suitable probe exists, RUM falls back to one of the control
plane-based techniques. For example, if the probed rule is fully covered by
higher priority rules, or if it covers other, already installed lower priority rules
that have exactly the same actions, probing cannot reveal when the rule got
installed.
Reducing the number of switch-speciﬁc values. This technique relies
on using a header ﬁeld and values that are unused by the live traﬃc in the
network. Because there may be few such ﬁelds and values, it is essential to
reduce the number of required values. However, to prevent the tested switch
from sending the probe directly to the controller, each two adjacent switches
need to have diﬀerent identiﬁers. Thus, instead of using a network-wide
unique value of Si for each switch i, one can solve an instance of the vertex
coloring problem for which there are well known heuristics [80].
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4.4 Implementation
We implement a RUM prototype that works as a TCP proxy between the
switches and the controller. The switches connect to the proxy as if it was
a controller, and the proxy then connects to a real controller using multiple
connections, impersonating the switches. This design allows us to modularly
compose RUM as a chain of proxies to add functionality and freely replace
components. For example, a barrier layer built on top of the acknowledg-
ment layer is just another proxy. We implement the proxies using the POX
platform.
In the current implementation we assume IP-only traﬃc and rely on the
ToS ﬁeld for probing. Because there are only 64 ToS values, we need to
periodically recycle them in longer experiments. Moreover, we assume that
the rules do not overlap,2 and therefore, selecting a probing packet degrades
to using the same source and destination addresses as in the rule’s match.
While the OpenFlow speciﬁcation lacks messages to conﬁrm that a rule
modiﬁcation was successfully applied, it deﬁnes error messages used when
something goes wrong. We reuse an error message with a newly deﬁned
(unused) error code for positive acknowledgments. Alternatively, one could
potentially add vendor-speciﬁc messages to the protocol.
Finally, the hardware switch we use does not support priorities but takes
the rule installation order to deﬁne the rule importance. Therefore, we care-
fully place the low priority rules early, and make sure that other rules do not
hide the high priority ones.
2Except a low priority drop-all and high priority probe rules
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Figure 4.6: Flow update times when using control-plane only tech-
niques. The reliability depends on correct estimation of the switch
performance.
4.5 Evaluation
We evaluate RUM in the same end to end experiment as presented before,
and using a hardware OpenFlow switch (HP 5406zl) that incorrectly im-
plements barriers.3 Further, we use low level benchmarks to analyze the
properties and trade-oﬀs in our techniques. Admittedly, these are just small
scale experiments. However, a large scale test would require a testbed built
of hardware switches because emulators use software switches that perform
diﬀerently than the real ones. We do not have access to such a testbed.
4.5.1 End to End Experiment
We ﬁrst show that the presented techniques solve the dropped packets prob-
lem described in Section 4.1. The setup is as in Section 4.1 and we send data
plane traﬃc at a rate of 250 packets/s per ﬂow (75000 packets/s in total). We
use the previously described control plane-only techniques and in Figure 4.6
3The precise characteristics can be found in Chapter 3.
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plot the times when the last data plane packet following the old path and
the ﬁrst packet going along the updated path arrives at the destination. The
area between the two lines visually represents the periods when packets get
dropped.4
An update with Barriermessages is the fastest, but because the Barrier
replies are arriving too soon, rules at switch S1 get updated before rules at
switch S2 are in place, which leads to extensive periods of packet drops (a to-
tal of 6000-7500 packets got lost in each of multiple runs of this experiment).
The three visible steps in ﬂow installation times are an artifact of the way
how the switch synchronizes the data and control plane (check Chapter 3).
Using a 300-ms timeout solves a packet drop problem, but increases the
average time it takes before a ﬂow starts following a new path from 592 ms
to 815 ms. Finally, while the 300-ms timeout is suﬃcient when there are up
to 300 rules in the switch ﬂow table, it becomes too short when the table
occupation grows (Chapter 3).
Based on the measurements, we set the adaptive timeout to assume that
a switch performs 200 and 250 rule modiﬁcations per second. We see that
the technique oﬀers a stable performance over time, however when ﬂow table
occupancy increases and the assumed update rate is overestimated (250), the
acknowledgments arrive too early and the network starts dropping packets.
Figure 4.7 shows the results of the same experiment but when using the
data plane probing techniques, which guarantee no packet drops. For com-
parison, we plot the result when all ﬂow modiﬁcations are issued at once to
all the switches (no wait). It shows the shortest update duration one can get,
limited only by the slowest switch update rate, but also oﬀers no theoretical
consistency guarantees. The sequential probing technique requires additional
4If the delay between the two packets is lower than our measurement precision, we plot
a single line.
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Figure 4.7: Flow update times with probing. There are no packet
drops and the overhead of the general technique is negligible com-
pared to the best achievable update time.
rule modiﬁcations (we modify a probing rule after every 10 real modiﬁca-
tions). This fact is noticeable, because the data plane synchronization steps
are more frequent which hurts the update performance. On the other hand,
the general probing technique does not require additional rule updates, but
only sending and receiving data plane probes. If probing up to 30 oldest ﬂow
modiﬁcations at once, every 10 ms, the ﬂows get updated almost as quickly
as the lower bound.
We originally send packets belonging to each of the updated ﬂows every
4 ms and observe no drops. To verify that there are no transient periods
shorter than 4 ms when packets are dropped, we randomly select a single
ﬂow ten times and send traﬃc for the ﬂow at 10000 packets a second. Once
again we observe no drops.
Barrier Layer Performance. To validate the overhead of a full barrier
layer, we rerun the same experiment with our reliable barrier layer introduced
before and sending a Barrier after every 10 ﬂow modiﬁcations. When a
switch does not reorder modiﬁcations across barriers, the total update time
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and the particular curve of ﬂow update times is the same as for the normal
sequential probing technique. On the other hand, if the switch can reorder
modiﬁcations and RUM needs to buﬀer them to ensure correct ordering, the
overhead is big and the total update time is twice that of the general probing
technique. Understandably, this time increases even more (up to 5 times) if
the barriers are more frequent (up to a barrier after each command).
4.5.2 Low Level Benchmarks
After observing that RUM achieves its main high level goal - allowing for
reliable network updates with consistency guarantees even on unreliable
switches, we analyze how changing variables in each technique aﬀects various
aspects of the update.
The setup in the next two experiments is the same. Initially, there is a
single, low priority drop-all-packets rule at the switch. Then, a controller
modiﬁes R rules in the switch in a way that at most K modiﬁcations are
unconﬁrmed at any time. When a modiﬁcation conﬁrmation comes, the con-
troller issues a new update. Meanwhile, we send data plane traﬃc matching
the modiﬁed rules again at a rate of 250 packets/s for each rule.
Data plane delay. First, we measure when packets matching a particular
rule start arriving at the destination (data plane activation) and when the
controller receives a conﬁrmation that the rule was installed (control plane
activation). In Figure 4.8 we plot the delay between the data plane and
control plane activations for various techniques for R = 300 and K = 300
(send all rules at once). All values below zero mean incorrect behavior and
positive values cause a delay during an update. Thus, the ideal behavior
would be a vertical line at x = 0. We see that, as mentioned in the introduc-
tion, Barrier replies arrive even 300 ms before the rule gets applied. Using
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Figure 4.8: Delay between data plane and control plane activa-
tion. Using barriers leads to incorrect behaviors, control plane
techniques increase the update time and the data plane techniques
strike a balance.
a 300-ms timeout ﬁxes the correctness problem in this case, but is very in-
eﬃcient — for the median the update wastes 230 ms on each Barrier. The
adaptive timeout technique achieves very good results, however, it requires
precise models, otherwise the delay can fall below zero (possible inconsis-
tencies). Finally, both probing techniques never incur a negative delay and,
accordingly, are within 70 ms and 30 ms after the data plane modiﬁcation
for 90% of modiﬁcations.
Impact of probing rules. A technique that relies on installing probing
rules to conﬁrm that previous modiﬁcations took place requires ﬁnding a
balance between the frequency of such conﬁrmations and measurement pre-
cision. In this experiment we issue R = 4000 modiﬁcations and vary the
number of modiﬁcations after which RUM sends a probing rule, as well as
the number of allowed, unconﬁrmed modiﬁcations (K). Table 4.1 shows that
the usable modiﬁcation rate (rate of real modiﬁcations, not counting probes)
is proportional to the number of rules probed at once and is usually close
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Probing frequency K = 20 K = 50 K = 100
after 1 update 51% 51% 51%
after 2 updates 64% 68% 68%
after 3 updates 69% 77% 77%
after 4 updates 72% 82% 82%
after 5 updates 74% 86% 86%
after 10 updates 76% 93% 94%
after 20 updates 74% 95% 98%
Table 4.1: Usable rule update rate with the sequential probing
technique (normalized to a rate with barriers).
to the expected rate. When the number of allowed unconﬁrmed messages is
low compared to the number of rules conﬁrmed at once, the controller does
not receive the conﬁrmations quickly enough to saturate the switch.
Number of probes a switch can process. Sending data plane probes
requires a switch to process two types of messages. First, an injecting switch
receives a PacketOut and forwards a probe packet to the required port. Then,
the receiving switch gets the packet, encapsulates it in a PacketIn message,
and sends it to the controller. In the previous experiments, we used software
switches as sending and receiving switches. Here, we instead benchmark the
performance of a real hardware switch. We measure the PacketOut rate
by issuing 20000 PacketOut messages and observe when the corresponding
packets arrive at the destination. Similarly, we install a rule forwarding all
traﬃc to the controller and inject traﬃc to the switch to measure the PacketIn
rate. The rates are 7006 PacketOut/s and 5531 PacketIn/s, averaged over
5 runs. Both of these values are suﬃcient to allow RUM to probe the rules
frequently.
Finally, our additional experiments show that processing PacketIn re-
quests in parallel with rule modiﬁcations has minimal impact on the rule
modiﬁcation throughput — new rate is over 96% of the original rate without
any other messages. Similarly, processing PacketOut messages in parallel
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with rule modiﬁcations decreases the rule update rate by at most 13% for
the ratio of PacketOut messages to rule modiﬁcations up to 5:1.
4.6 Summary
A system presented in this chapter shows how to utilize data and control
plane separation in SDN as well as software resources of the controller ma-
chine to improve reliability of computer networks. RUM, at the cost of short
added latency, makes unreliable switches usable in a network without requir-
ing any changes in the controllers or the devices themselves.
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Chapter 5
Related Work
Software Deﬁned Networks are becoming popular in both the scientiﬁc and
commercial settings. Such interest leads to many research directions that
quickly advance the state-of-the-art. This chapter contains an overview of
work most closely related to the topics presented in this dissertation.
5.1 Functional Testing
Functional testing tools for SDN focus either on switches or controllers, where
the controller correctness is often checked by veriﬁcation of rules and network
conﬁgurations that it generates.
5.1.1 Switch-Level Testing
Switch-level testing treats the device under test as a black box. To ensure
that the test results do not depend on external factors, the interactions with
the controller and other network elements are commonly emulated by the
testing framework. This approach typically requires a large number of test
cases to achieve high coverage. A test speciﬁcation for OpenFlow 1.0 is over
100 pages long [1] and the test speciﬁcation for 1.3 version of the protocol is
already 400 pages long [2]. Each test case is carefully designed to target a
speciﬁc feature and checks the correctness of simple functionalities. Develop-
ers, using tools such as OFTest (a uniﬁed framework used to test correctness
of OpenFlow switches) [8] have to manually provide step by step execution
scenarios containing the inputs and expected outputs. SOFT automates this
time-consuming and complicated process of designing test cases.
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Another, more automatized, approach to black-box testing of SDN de-
vices [83] relies on switch models to generate test cases. While the resulting
set of tests allows for systematic exploration of switch behaviors, its quality
depends on the model. Creating such models is diﬃcult, requires adjustments
after any speciﬁcation change and if done incorrectly negatively aﬀects test
coverage. SOFT instead infers the model automatically by exploring the
code itself. It also does not require correct behavior speciﬁcations.
Instead of testing the switches before deployment, some argue for veri-
ﬁcation in production [74]. This approach adds an additional load on the
network and is more closely related to monitoring than testing. Cost of
bugs in a running network is usually higher than for ones uncovered before
deployment.
SOFT design is based heavily on recent developments in research on sym-
bolic execution. Symbolic execution [24] and selective symbolic execution [28]
is capable of testing even large systems. However, blindly applying symbolic
execution results in an exponential explosion of code paths. It also requires
excessive human eﬀort to specify correct behavior. SOFT eﬀectively over-
comes these issues and goes one step further by coalescing constraints that
result in the same output, and using the constraint solver to identify incon-
sistent behaviors.
Symbolic execution can be also eﬃciently applied to verify software data
plane pipelines [31]. The authors show that splitting packet processing pro-
grams into smaller segments improves veriﬁcation times by orders of magni-
tude. While functionally similar to SDN switches, software packet processors
are easy to split by design and switches’ code is monolithic. SOFT uses a
similar idea when sending partially concretized input messages in separate
test cases.
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Complementary to SOFT, Kothari et al. [57] use symbolic execution to
identify protocol manipulation attacks. The goal here is for a node to try to
determine harmful behavior induced upon itself by received messages from
other participants. In contrast, SOFT systematically determines and com-
pares the input subspaces of multiple implementations to ﬁnd inconsistencies,
without prior knowledge of correct behavior.
While the main focus of this dissertation is on SDN switches, the topic of
network devices testing is not new. We assume that the switch hardware is
veriﬁed using standard veriﬁcation techniques [30, 33]. SOFT is designed to
check software instead. There are also various methods and tools that check
correctness and performance of routers and switches as a whole [22,27,41,89].
However, these methods are mostly ad-hoc and depend on a speciﬁc protocol
and device features. By simply comparing two implementations, the theory
behind SOFT is protocol independent.
5.1.2 Network-Level Testing and Debugging
In the recent years researchers developed a large set of tools designed to
verify network policies. However, tools such as Anteater [63], Header Space
Analysis [50], NetPlumber [51], VeriFlow [52] and Libra [88] cannot detect
any problem with switches. They model switch behavior instead of using
real implementations.
Other tools like NoD [61] and Batﬁsh [34] incorporate a domain speciﬁc
language to analyze conﬁguration correctness. But they also sidestep the
problem of real switch correctness.
Finally, NICE [26] is a tool for testing unmodiﬁed OpenFlow controller
applications. It combines model checking and concolic execution in order to
systematically explore the behavior of the network under a variety of possible
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event orderings. NICE and SOFT target fundamentally diﬀerent parts of
the network: controller vs. switches. In NICE, only the controller is running
the unmodiﬁed application, while other elements (switches, end hosts) are
replaced with simpliﬁed models. In contrast, SOFT ﬁnds inconsistencies
among the implementations of OpenFlow agents that run in the switches.
5.2 Switch Performance Measurements
Switch data and control plane performance is essential for successful Open-
Flow deployments, therefore it was a subject of measurements in the past.
During their work on the FlowVisor network slicing mechanism, Sherwood et
al. [77] report switch CPU-limited performance of about few hundred Open-
Flow port status requests per second. Similarly, as part of their work on the
Devoﬂow modiﬁcations of the OpenFlow model [29], Curtis et al. identify
and explain the reasons for relatively slow rule installation rate on an HP
OpenFlow switch. OFLOPS [72] is perhaps the ﬁrst framework for OpenFlow
switch evaluation. Its authors used it to perform ﬁne-grained measurements
of packet modiﬁcation times, ﬂow table update rate, and ﬂow monitoring ca-
pabilities. This work made interesting observations, for example that some
OpenFlow agents did not support the Barrier command. OFLOPS also
reported some delay between the control plane’s rule installation and the
data plane’s ability to forward packets according to the new rule. OFLOPS-
Turbo [71] is a more recent extension of the previous work. It improves mea-
surement precision and increases traﬃc generation speed. Huang et al. [44]
perform switch measurements while building High-Fidelity Switch models
that will be used during emulation with Open vSwitches. This work quanti-
ﬁes the variations in control path delays and the impact of ﬂow table design
(hardware, software, combinations thereof) at a coarse grain (average be-
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havior). This paper also reports surprisingly slow ﬂow setup rates. Relative
to these works, we dissect switch performance at a ﬁner grain, over longer
time periods, and more systematically in terms of rule combinations, initial
parameters, etc. In addition, we identify thresholds that reveal previously
unreported anomalous behaviors.
Another recent measurement study [42] focuses on data plane-based up-
date rates. We observe both data and control planes and compare states in
both. We also reveal performance variability present only in longer experi-
ments.
Jive [59] proposes to build a proactive OpenFlow switch probing engine.
Jive measures performance using predetermined patterns, e.g., inserting a
sequence of rules in order of increasing/decreasing priority, and reports large
diﬀerences in installation times in an hardware switch. The observed switch
behavior can be stored in a database, and later used to increase network
performance. We show that the switch performance depends on so many
factors that such a database would be diﬃcult to create.
In the early days of SDN, Bianco et al. [20] measured and compared the
data plane packet processing performance of a software OpenFlow implemen-
tation in Linux. This work is orthogonal to our benchmarks, since we focus
on ﬂow table updates, not the packet forwarding.
5.3 Network Monitoring and Debugging
Monitoring and debugging tools constantly observe and analyze the state of
the entire network. If a particular invariant gets violated, they raise an alarm.
All the techniques discussed in this section work in a running system and can
act only after a failure happens. Solutions presented in this dissertation work
oﬄine, before deployment. Therefore, problems get detected before they can
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aﬀect real traﬃc.
Automatic Test Packet Generation [87] is a solution based on Header
Space Analysis that creates a minimum set of test packets required to cover
all links or rules in the network. Then, ATPG uses these packets to detect
and localize failures.
Similarly, Monocle [66] generates probe packets for each forwarding rule
installed in a network. It then injects the probes in nearby switches to make
sure that all rules expected by the controller are actively forwarding packets.
Both these systems can quickly detect problems in networks, and po-
tentially pin them down to a single switch or even a single rule. However,
they cannot answer the question if a rule is incorrect because of a bug in
the switch, a faulty controller, an incorrect policy or any other reason. We
concentrate on the heterogeneity of switches.
NetSight [40] is a platform that records and allows for quick retrieval of
packet histories. The histories contain information about switches and rules
traversed by each packet. While useful in debugging of a running network,
this tool has the same limitation as the two works discussed above.
OFRewind [81] and STS [73] help with debugging network problems after
they occur. Both enable temporary consistent network event trace recording
in a running system. Since they rely on switch models when replaying control
messages, both tools are helpless if the root cause of a particular problem
lies in a switch.
5.4 Techniques to Improve SDNs
FlowVisor [77] is probably the ﬁrst example of using a software layer between
switches and controllers in SDN in order to add new network functionality
without complicating the controller. It allows multiple controller applica-
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tions to share the same network without risking conﬂicts with each other.
FlowVisor shows that introducing such a middle layer is acceptable from
the performance point of view, and is later followed by many proxy-based
solutions (RUM among them).
RUM is the ﬁrst attempt to look at the network update consistency from
the practical point of view, using the real switches. There many solutions
that guarantee particular properties during an update, but they all assume
correctly-functioning switches. For example, consistent updates [70] guaran-
tee that packets can follow either a network conﬁguration before the update
started or after it ended, never a mix of the two. Incremental consistent up-
dates [49] reduce the rule overhead required to provide consistent updates.
To avoid overloading links when rerouting big ﬂows, zUpdate [60] takes into
account additional information about the load induced by each ﬂow. Some
techniques [79] can guarantee consistency properties even in networks that
use both SDN and traditional switches at the same time. Finally, Mahajan
and Wattenhofer [62] introduce a taxonomy of network update consistency
levels and analyze the costs of each. Chapter 3 shows that an assumption
about correctly functioning switches does not hold, and RUM is a potential
workaround that allows the aforementioned solutions to work correctly.
Dionysus [46] and ESPRES [67] reduce mean ﬂow rerouting times by
treating the entire network update as a scheduling problem with dependency
constraints. They rate-limit and reorder particular rule updates based on
runtime information to fully utilize available switches. Both systems are
based on an observation that switches may apply rule updates at diﬀerent,
often unpredictable, speeds and therefore, following a static update schedule
is ineﬃcient. Like RUM, Dionysus and ESPRES are software based solu-
tions, but instead of ﬁxing switch limitations, they concentrate on improving
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performance. Moreover, ESPRES relies on a correctly working Barrier mes-
sage. RUM introduced an additional layer in the software stack that may
provide the required guarantees.
NOSIX [84] notices the diversity of OpenFlow switches and creates a layer
of abstraction between the controller and the switches. This layer provides
a translation of commands to optimize for a particular switch based on its
capabilities and performance. However, its authors do not analyze dynamic
switch properties, so the results from this thesis may be useful for NOSIX to
improve the optimization process. Tango [58] sets to solve a similar problem
as NOSIX and improves network performance by adjusting commands to
switch capabilities. Its authors go one step further and propose a method for
inferring switch performance similar to the one we presented in Chapter 3.
These two pieces of work are the closest in spirit to this dissertation.
In a similar fashion, Parniewicz et al. [65] design a hardware abstraction
layer (HAL). HAL is a software layer that adds OpenFlow functionality to
legacy network devices. It translates between OpenFlow messages and the
proprietary conﬁguration interface commands to mask that there are various
switches in the network. We instead start with a more speciﬁc problem where
all switches support OpenFlow, but not equally well.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
Software Deﬁned Networks owe their increasing adoption to the promise
that increased programmability will lower costs and simplify network man-
agement. However, unexpected failures in production networks can quickly
negate trust in such a new technology. Given how much the existing Open-
Flow switches diverge from the speciﬁcation and diﬀer from each other, pro-
gramming controllers is diﬃcult. Developers have to, ﬁrst, realize what spe-
cial behavior each switch exhibits, and then, incorporate appropriate case
handling in their code. Even measuring switch behavior in the corner cases
is not trivial and in the absence of systematic methods can lead to unnoticed
issues and show an incomplete picture. Further, the resulting controller soft-
ware is complex, diﬃcult to test and not future-proof.
This dissertation makes ﬁrst steps towards providing controllers with a
uniﬁed switch view. The two presented testing and benchmarking tools:
SOFT and the switch benchmark allow users to better understand heteroge-
neous switch behaviors. Moreover, switch vendors and network administra-
tors can use these tools to quickly detect problems and get conﬁdence that
their devices work correctly. SOFT detected seven inconsistencies between
two software switches implementing the same speciﬁcation version. They
vary from relatively harmless missing features and diﬀerent error messages,
to such serious ones as program crashing and silently ignoring conﬁguration
messages. The switch benchmark not only classiﬁes ﬂow table update perfor-
mance depending on changing parameters, but also revealed safety-aﬀecting
errors. Untrustworthy barriers and nonatomic rule modiﬁcations are against
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common assumptions made by controller developers, and if left unaddressed
may compromise network security.
RUM is a software layer that sidesteps the problem of unreliable barriers
by providing true rule modiﬁcation conﬁrmations. It is also an implementa-
tion of a wider vision, where between SDN switches and controllers, there is
a software processing pipeline that hides issues caused by switch heterogene-
ity. It takes advantage of the “software” part in SDN, since applying ﬁxes in
software is often quicker and cheaper than modifying switch hardware.
Finally, this dissertation would ideally serve as a call for other researchers
to contribute to building such a software switch uniﬁcation layer.
6.1 Future Work
Solutions presented in this dissertation are suﬃcient to defect a wide range
of issues with SDN switches, but there are still many ways in which they can
be improved. The ideas presented here aim to simplify the benchmarking
process while improving its coverage. They also envision using collective
community eﬀorts to advance our understanding of switches and improve
the quality of testing solutions.
6.1.1 Automatically Inferring Performance Corner Cases
Currently the switch benchmark includes a set of test cases that cover the
space of parameters that aﬀect ﬂow table update characteristics. The space
is sampled with statically chosen concrete values of these parameters. When
operators running the tool encounter unexplained switch behaviors, they
have to manually adjust the parameters in search of the root cause. Such a
human-driven investigation is time consuming and requires an expert to lead
the exploration.
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Instead, the benchmark could take advantage of recent advancements in
machine learning and optimizations. The parameter space could be explored
automatically, with a goal to maximize/minimize a given metric. Such a
metric can be deﬁned, for example, as the delay between data and control
plane rule activation or the overall update rate.
The improvement here can go one step further. There are techniques that
automatically detect minimal causal sequences causing an error to occur [73,
85, 86]. Similarly, after ﬁnding dangerous switch behavior the benchmark
could trim the sequence of messages that caused it to a minimal subset
required to reproduce the case.
After incorporating such changes, the benchmark would become accessi-
ble to any switch owner. After recording an unexpected behavior and produc-
ing a minimal sequence required to reproduce the issue, users could simply
send it to the switch vendors for further analysis.
6.1.2 Trustworthy Switch Models
Limited access to switches posed one of the main challenges while performing
the studies reported in this thesis. A researcher or a controller developer
usually has access to only few devices. Considering how much the switches
diﬀer, it is an insuﬃcient number to properly test any solution that should
work in a real network. Instead, developers usually rely on emulators and
software switches. However, performance of such software switches rarely
corresponds to any hardware switch.
Preparing a collection of software models of hardware switches can solve
this problem. After a public release, many users of the automatized bench-
mark should be able to report measurements collected on devices they have
access to. Precise software models can be then constructed based on such
117
reports and made available to the developers.
Such models would be useful in multiple contexts. First, tools like RUM
should take them into account to improve the precision of rule modiﬁcation
conﬁrmations. More importantly, such models are practical in controller
testing. Built as a proxy placed between the controller and a switch, such
a model intercepts the communication between the two. The proxy adjusts
the timing and content of messages, while staying transparent for both ends
of the communication channel.
We already prepared such models for HP and Pica8 switches based on
measurements reported in Chapter 3. They proved to be useful when evalu-
ating RUM and various other tools developed afterwards.
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